An international Energy Company & independent engineering company have performed preliminary studies for an In-Line Robot (ILR) Project including: feasibility study, turbine design (with CFD calculations and flow assurance) and Energy Balance Assessments. This Robot will be a tetherless autonomous device capable of travelling with/against production flow to accomplish pigging and inspection missions inside pipelines with minimum production impacts. This is particularly adapted for single line long tie-backs, thanks to regenerative power management but the complexity of subsea architecture, flow conditions & fluids services raises some challenges. The ILR development is programmed over five phases (Feasibility study, Preliminary Systems design & Energy Balance Assessment, Flow Loop Bench Testing, Prototype Testing and Commercialisation). Phase 2 utilised Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) simulation models to assess power extraction levels from production flow across various scenarios whilst minimising pressure drop. The results obtained included the turbine CFD models that were coupled to power conversion and storage modules in order to ensure that system drive and power managementwere captured in a closed loop. An operational envelope was established considering the preliminary turbine design simulations as well as the associated energy balance. This paper will present the results to date along with the key design features of the ILR and how the data will be used to verify the operational envelope during the next phase, Flow Loop Bench Testing which is due to start in late 2019. This will provide data to configure and predict operational envelopes of the robot for different flow patterns and fluid types.

The Laggan & Tormore gas fields are situated some 125km north west of the Shetland Islands on the UK Continental Shelf, in approximately 600 metres water depth. The reservoir fluids are delivered directly from the subsea wells to the Shetland Gas Plant (SGP) through twin 18" diameter 143km flowlines. During the project phase of this development it became apparent that the site and support teams would require a method of monitoring and predicting flow assurance issues such as hydrate inhibition, slugging and liquid holdup, as well as optimising complex operations such as pigging and flowline depressurisation/repressurisation. The solution was the Pipeline Management System (PMS), a tool designed to predict the behaviour of fluids in the two 143km multiphase pipelines between the subsea systems and the arrival facilities at the SGP. The PMS combines LedaFlow, a dynamic multiphase flow simulator, with K-Spice, a dynamic process simulator. The Laggan-Tormore PMS was the first use of LedaFlow in an integrated simulator. The LedaFlow technology was developed by Total, ConocoPhillips and SINTEF over the last 15 years with Kongsberg joining the project in 2008 as a commercialisation partner. The model derives the multiphase hydrodynamic behaviour of oil, gas and water along a pipeline and approximates the behaviour in the radial directions via results from laboratory experiments and in depth knowledge of the physics of flow in a circular pipe. The PMS was developed by Kongsberg in conjunction with the Total E&P UK field operations team. It consists of an online, open-loop simulator, which allows the operations team to make decisions based on real time information of fluid behaviour in the flowlines, and an offline simulator, which allows what-if analyses to be carried out. The PMS has been in operation since Laggan-Tormore start up in February 2016. This paper will provide further details on the use of the LedaFlow technology and the operational aspects of the Laggan-Tormore PMS, giving an overview of the following: – The utilisation of the LedaFlow technology; – The various applications of both the online and offline modes of operation of the PMS and; – The benefits and challenges associated with the use of the PMS during its first year of operation.

Competency - the Partnership Approach Within Oil and Gas service companies, there is tension between developing medium to long-term capability and delivering the service clients demand. Balancing these two requirements is a continual challenge. Both employers and employees recognise a constant need to develop their skills and knowledge base, and an important requirement of an employer is to be astutely aware of their organisation's talent requirements. Employers must identify and acquire talent through recruitment or retraining, and once acquired, employees must be trained and developed to meet the specific business demands for the present and the future. The need to ensure the effectiveness and application of the knowledge transfer process is more important than ever, and has to be done by measuring the skills and knowledge of the individual through a structured competence programme. There are practical challenges of embedding a competency process within an international organisation and these will be explored in this paper. In the past, the oil and gas industry placed a high premium on experience, which is by definition a reflection of time served. The rapidly changing needs of clients necessitate the acceleration of learning and development activity in the workplace, as the supply of experienced individuals does not always meet the demand. Therefore employers are required to obtain talent and accelerate the knowledge and skills of existing employees, ensuring that talent has been converted into a capability that adds value to the organisation and fulfils client needs by ensuring delivery of excellent service quality. Traditional competency measurement of skill and knowledge has been paper-based, and whilst effective, has proven to be both labour and time intensive when performed by assessors. An alternative approach is electronic competence measurement deployed via a learning management system that allows for electronic knowledge and skills assessment, reducing administration burden and the need for assessor intervention through the automatic recording of completions. If not skillfully managed the binary nature of this approach can limit the integrity and robustness of the system so it is imperative to ensure that additional measures are introduced to maintain and indeed enhance the assurance of the individual's competency. This paper will discuss the cultural, geographical and technological challenges encountered and how they were resolved during the development of a global competency-based system, in an international service company. The paper will propose a | number of innovative methods to address the issues encountered when incorporating a global electronic competency system, whilst maintaining its on-going integrity.

This paper explores the challenge of gathering, assessing and usefully managing large quantities of hull inspection data so that this can provide useful information. It will address assessment of the data to ensure that it is possible to clearly understand what is important today, what might be an issue tomorrow and to identify trends and evaluate inspection / repair burdens in the future. As an FPSO hull structure ages, the routine structural inspection activities produce increasing volumes of data as time progresses. In the initial years of production this does not present a major issue to manage as the number of structural deficiencies will (hopefully) be small. Beyond 10 – 15 years on-station, where inspections are carried out there are often significant numbers of inspection findings reported (>1500 per year). It is important that data is captured accurately at the time of inspection, whilst the personnel and access are available. In the early years of asset life, where the number of findings may be only 1 or 2 per day of inspection, efficient handling of the data and assessment isn't a high priority. During busy inspection campaigns during the later life of the asset, good quality reporting and efficient data handling become critical factors as it is possible to have 3 inspection teams on an asset producing upwards of 60 inspection findings per day, 7 days per week. Failure to effectively keep up with the processing of the inspection findings under these conditions will result in inaccuracies in the data and a failure to correctly assess criticality and the necessary actions arising. Based on Marine Technical Limits extensive experience of managing significant volumes of hull inspection data for various FPSOs over the previous 10 years, this paper will detail the key criteria and an effective approach for handling, processing, assessing and using hull inspection data to produce useful information.

In this paper, we will report on the development of an environmental case approach for GDF SUEZ E&P UK. As one of the now adopted recommendations of the Maitland report following the Deepwater Horizon disaster, OGUK is taking forward its Environmental Assurance Plan concept. In support of this, GDF SUEZ E&P UK commissioned Xodus to develop a number of environmental management plans for its Cygnus Field Development that could reduce the administrative burden, ensure compliance and enhance internal and external dialogue about the management of environmental issues. The resulting E-cases are central to the company’s environmental management system, bridge the gap between operational objectives and stakeholder expectations and provide an audit trail between these high level objectives and individual tasks and responsibilities as depicted in the figure below. The E-cases mirror the intent of Lord Cullen’s Safety Case approach in that they offer a way to maximise the benefits of both prescriptive and goal setting regulation. They do this by creating a platform for open dialogue about these important issues, and achieve full integration of environmental management into the operation and maintenance of offshore E&P operations. The E-cases are fully aligned with the international standard on environmental management systems ISO14001.

The Wave Glider is a flagship product, the world’s first marine vehicle that harnesses kinetic energy from wave action to produce locomotion in the ocean, while remaining environmentally friendly and fuel-free; Wave Gliders are completely self-sustaining using solar panels to power their payloads. The platform includes navigational and control systems, and communication to an operations center via satellite. Control with full security can be transferred to a local set-up via a master/slave system. This game changing technology provides persistent ocean presence and a reliable data acquisition platform which can support numerous applications in the oil and gas industry. The drilling industry will benefit from magnetic survey applications for better error control. Exploration & production has applications for effective SEEP surveys, turbidity monitoring and METOC (meteorology and oceanography) applications. The subsea world will benefit from a cost effective method for data harvesting (Gateway Communications). This talk is focused around case studies conducted for customers around the world to illustrate system operation (excellence in execution), data acquisition and data analysis revolving around the applications discussed above. Value is enhanced when a number of these sensors are deployed on a swarm of Wave Gliders to conduct pre-site baseline surveys for risk and insurance management.

Although occupational safety metrics in the Oil and Gas Industry have continued on a downward trend for many years, major accidents have continued to occur around the world. Individual assets and operators will generally have no individual recent history of major accidents but must nevertheless learn from this overall body of major accidents and their precursors. The immediate technical causes for these accidents are generally well understood and improvements can usually be implemented by everyone. There is however only limited value in trying to prevent just lookalike accidents. A study of a range of accidents over the last 100 years identifies common themes, particularly in the areas of proper assessment of risk, management of change and the basic control of work at the workface. To control these aspects properly, reliably and sustainably requires an overarching system of work control that is commensurate with the risks and consequences of more or less all activities in a business. ConocoPhillips UK Upstream has carried out a thorough review and overhaul of management systems designed to fully comply with its own corporate standards and UK legislation. During this review the decision was made to create an Operating Management System to incorporate all necessary processes and controls to deliver a safe, high performing operation. The features of the developed system are described along with insights that may help others contemplating assessment and overhaul of their own systems.

With a significant proportion of the UK's offshore infrastructure having exceeded the original design life, the ageing population of offshore installations presents a constant and growing challenge to safety. Ageing is characterised by deterioration which, in the severe operational environment offshore, can have serious consequences for asset integrity if not managed properly. The Health and Safety Executive's Ageing and Life Extension Inspection Programme, also known as Key Programme 4 (KP4), was launched in July 2010 to the UK offshore industry. The purpose of KP4 is to: determine whether the risks to asset integrity associated with ageing and life extension are being controlled effectively; raise awareness of the need for specific consideration of ageing issues as a distinct activity within the asset integrity management process and of the need for senior management to demonstrate leadership on this matter; identify shortcomings in duty holder practices in the management of ageing and life extension and enforce an appropriate programme of remedial action; work with the offshore industry to develop a ‘best practice’ common approach to the management of ageing installations and life extension. The first year of KP4 entailed a programme of eight duty holder onshore and offshore inspections, covering a wide spectrum of topic areas, including organisational factors, structural integrity, materials (including corrosion), maritime integrity, mechanical integrity, process plant integrity, fire and explosion integrity, electrical and control systems integrity, wells and offshore pipelines. This paper presents a general overview of KP4 and a summary of progress made and initial findings in the first year of KP4.

Recent incidents have highlighted the increased importance of situation awareness and its relationship to crisis management, With studies showing some 40% of incidents being related to operational error the need for an effective process safety management (PSM) framework which melds procedural automation with a previously IT centric business process management (BPM) environment could be seen to be advantageous. The final hurdle to a fully integrated solution has been the capturing of stranded assets e.g. where data collection is not possible, consistency of timely manual information or a heavy reliance on experienced human elements to consider information context. The realization that an "Incident free" mission statement can effectively drive business strategy when used in conjunction with a mobile workforce is acknowledged. When used as part of an operator driven reliability program, we have a solution which captures tacit knowledge, improves inter-departmental collaboration and enables sensor to boardroom visibility. This Enterprise Control model enables the right people to consistently do the right thing optimally planned within the operational schedule. This paper will describe how technology can be used as a change agent, not only to enable the consistent monitoring of previously stranded assets (People, Plant & Processes) but to change the workflow dynamics of the PSM model with field proven improvements in Safety and Productivity.

Abstract Description : ChevronTexaco believes that global climate change is an important issue and is taking action to address it in a comprehensive way. We recently made publicly available our corporate-wide system for estimating greenhouse gas emissions and energy utilization. This paper specifically focuses on the advantages of using a systematic, auditable energy and greenhouse gas (GHG) management system in a mature oilfield. Material in this paper is based on our experience in using Chevron Texaco's SANGEA™ Emissions Estimating System at upstream locations in the North Sea and worldwide. Results, Observations and Conclusions : A credible, systematic approach, such as the SANGEA™ Emissions Estimating System, provides strategic value to mature fields that are facing increasing constraints on greenhouse gas emissions and increasing energy costs. By having a rigorous and verifiable inventory of greenhouse gas emissions, operators can demonstrate to government and nongovernmental organizations how greenhouse gas emissions change over time as a field ages. In addition, energy utilization and greenhouse gas emission information can be used to guide investments, in order to achieve the maximum energy efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions minimization per barrel produced. Applications : ChevronTexaco's new system, the SANGEA™ Emissions Estimating System, is an automated, electronic data management information system that is designed to gather monthly energy and greenhouse gas emissions data from worldwide exploration and production, refining and marketing, petrochemicals, transportation and coal activities. ChevronTexaco Corporation and its Chevron, Texaco and Caltex facilities enter data to calculate greenhouse gas emissions and energy utilization on a monthly basis. Energy and greenhouse gas emission estimates are reported to ChevronTexaco Corporation each quarter. Technical Contributions : The SANGEA™ Emissions Estimating System is now publicly available. ChevronTexaco is making the system available free of charge in order to promote standardization of methodologies, and to improve comparability of greenhouse gas inventory information across the petroleum industry worldwide. We believe that widespread use of the SANGEA(tm) software will help provide a standard methodology for our industry. The American Petroleum Institute and several petroleum companies around the world have requested review copies of the software system. Introduction Worldwide concern over global climate change has prompted governments and companies to take action to address emissions of greenhouse gases. One important source of greenhouse gases is production and use of fossil fuels. Oil exploration and production activities have come under increased scrutiny by government and nongovernmental agencies for their emissions of greenhouse gases. In order to address these concerns in a meaningful way, a systematic approach is needed. Meaningful, credible data are important both to manage energy utilization and emissions, as well as to provide a basis for common understanding of the unique issues associated with greenhouse gas emissions from mature fields.

This paper was prepared for presentation at the 1999 Offshore Europe Conference held in Aberdeen, Scotland, 7–9 September 1999.

Abstract Midland & Scottish Resources PLC (MSR) is a company which was established to exploit production opportunities in marginal fields, with a combination of reusable facilities and a management structure which directs and responds through short and effective lines of communication. As owner and licensed operator of the Emerald Field, MSR's wholly owned subsidiary Midland & Scottish Energy Limited (MSE) had to develop and apply realistic strategies for ensuring safe and stable operations in the face of a declining asset. The paper deals frankly and openly with the experience gained and lessons learned from developing and applying innovative techniques to meet this challenge. From the outset, the Safety Case and a Total Quality Management System were used as both focus and drive for a company strategy that demanded change in both workforce attitude and management practice. It provided an opportunity for fostering workforce involvement but techniques and procedures had to be developed in order to demystify terms such as ALARP and to make them usable in the workplace. A system was conceived and developed by the company to enable workplace risk assessments to be performed and demonstrated. This approach has not only improved risk management but also led to generation and continuous renewal of operating procedures that are effectively targeted to critical activities and visibly linked to the Safety Case. Innovations in the production and treatment of safety management system documentation, that enabled their active ownership, were also developed. These were intended to facilitate accurate translation of policy into practice and underpin the Safety Case by ensuring it faithfully reflected operational activity. Difficulties arose for some, in the acceptance and understanding of devolved authorities and in determining the appropriate authority levels for certain decision making. Cautionary lessons were also learned when certain innovative changes to safety management practices were misunderstood. The paper concludes by outlining the next stages of development for the management systems in order to deliver improved mechanisms for change control, performance standards and competency. Introduction Discovered in 1978, the Emerald Field lies in the East Shetland Basin, Block 2/15a. Sovereign Oil & Gas commenced the development as Operator in January 1989, with MSR contracted to provide all equipment and services. Development drilling took place between 1989 and 1990, with a forecast recovery of 40+ MMbbl. Seven Producing Wells and four Injectors were established and plateau production of 31,000 BOPD was anticipated. With a thin producing section and known gas cap, water injection from the outset was regarded as essential. Although the development drilling programme went to plan, lump sum contracts let by MSR for conversion of an AKER H3 drilling unit to a floating production facility (FPF), for supply and installation of subsea equipment and installation of a mooring system for the floating storage tanker (FSU), overran from an eighteen month schedule to forty two months. Claims for extra costs from the contractor were successfully resisted in the courts but liquidated damages paid by the contractor were much less than MSR's own delay cost. Similar delays were encountered in the contract for conversion of the storage tanker, but without the same protection on cost overruns. Figure 1 presents a schematic of the installed Emerald Field facilities. During this period it became apparent, from the results of development drilling, that some of the producing wells were not well positioned; being closer to the gas cap, and in some cases the aquifer, than was desirable. Recoverable reserves were downgraded to just under 30 MMbbl, putting the project finances arranged by MSR into jeopardy. This necessitated financial restructuring, including a change from a purchase of the production facility to a charter arrangement. It also led to a reluctance among partners to P. 257

Abstract The offshore industry is constantly being challenged to demonstrate environmental awareness and sound environmental management. Nowhere is this more true than Liverpool Bay off the west coast of the United Kingdom where BHP Petroleum E/R/A/ME Region (BHP), formerly Hamilton Oil Company Ltd, is presently operating in both exploration and development phases of operation. BHP has drilled over 20 exploration and development wells in these shallow, nearshore and environmentally sensitive waters. Now BHP is preparing to install 7 fixed installations and to drill additional development wells to support a large integrated offshore development. BHP must demonstrate that it can manage the environmental issues associated with this development whilst meeting the demands of a highly cost conscious industry in the face of tightening regulatory control and growing public awareness. Describing and documenting an environmental management system is relatively common place. Completing an environmental impact assessment (EIA) is increasingly common, even for offshore projects. However, the authors believe that little has been done to formally link the results from an EIA with a company's environmental management system. In comparison this has been done with UK Offshore Safety Cases where a hazard assessment study has been coupled with a Safety Management System to demonstrate understanding and effective management of the key safety risks. The authors believe that linking the key environmental risks to the environmental management system is essential to achieve effective management. It was with these thoughts in mind that the authors developed the Liverpool Bay Case for the Environment (the Case). The Case has been designed as a practical working tool, with a number of objectives in mind. It aims ultimately to demonstrate the use of "best available techniques not entailing excessive cost" (BATNEEC) for all operations. It assists in setting practical targets and identifies variances between these targets and current performance. Furthermore, it provides a focus for evaluating and justifying prioritised improvements by directing attention to where there is the greatest measured (as opposed to perceived) risk. Equally important, it also demonstrates where action/expenditure is not merited. The Case challenges more complicated attempts at risk management and can be easily interpreted by the offshore supervisor. Quantifying risk in a scientific, systematic manner allows the actual environmental risks to be identified rather than those risks that may be currently in vogue. The authors believe this to be of significant benefit, as it helps ensure the key risks are addressed by Management. The Case mirrors the essential elements of accepted Safety Case methodology. There is, however, a fundamental difference in that there is no easy parallel to the safety concept, where risk to human life is the measure of acceptability. The paper describes how this difficulty was overcome and how the results of these studies are translated into effective management of the key environmental risks of a major offshore development. Introduction BHP Petroleum (BHP), formerly Hamilton Oil Company Ltd, has been operating offshore UK for over 20 years. In this time, the company has achieved a number of "firsts", notably first oil from the North Sea in 1975 (Argyll field). By the end of 1995 the Company should have another first to its credit, first oil from the Liverpool Bay Development off the west coast of England in the Irish Sea. P. 585

Abstract The UK, North Sea, Emerald Field is a marginal oil field that has not lived up to expectations. A combination of disappointing reservoir performance and equipment start-up problems resulted in lower than anticipated daily oil production. This paper describes the experience of Midland & Scottish Energy in managing the reservoir and operating the field facilities. Introduction The Emerald field is located in Block 2/15a, some 200 miles northeast of Aberdeen and 75 miles northeast of Lerwick in the East Shetland Basin, at a water depth of 150 metres (Fig. 1). The field is small to medium in size containing an estimated initial oil in place of 186 mmbbls and 78 BCF of gas. Recoverable reserves are currently estimated at 18 mmbbls. The field which extends into Blocks 2/10a and 3/11b is a faulted and dip closed elongate feature on a "transitional shelf" between the Shetland Platform and the Viking Graben. The hydrocarbons are trapped in the permeable and porous Emerald sandstones at depths between 5150 ft and 5600 ft subsea The reservoir overlies PreCambrian and Devonian basement and is sealed by the overlying Heather formation shales. The oil is believed to have migrated westerly from the Viking Graben into the reservoir and has biodegreded. Production commenced in August 1992 and quickly peaked at 25,000 BOPD before falling to a present level of around 9,000 BOPD. Emerald Field Facilities Floating facilities. The Emerald field facilities consist of two floating units. The "Emerald Producer" a Floating Production Facility (FPF) is located directly above a central control base and six cluster wells. Four of the central wells are producers, one is a water injector and one has been suspended. Located some 2.5 km to the southeast are two further water injection wells and 2 km to the northwest of the central location are three producing wells and one water injection well. Stabilised crude is exported 2.3 km to the "Ailsa Craig" a Floating Storage Unit (FSU) for export from the field by shuttle tanker (Fig. 2). The "Emerald Producer" was formerly the Jebsen's drilling rig "Ali Baba", an Aker H-3 twin-hull, self propelled semi-submersible. A full process plant was fitted on the upper deck and two 3.80 m diameter stability columns were fitted aft to provide additional buoyancy and increase the deckload capacity. The drilling derrick was removed and replaced with a workover derrick capable of supporting coiled tubing and wireline operations. The production facilities separate oil, gas and water in a two stage single train process system (Fig. 3). Twin train compression is provided to supply lift gas to all producing wells (Fig. 4). Up to 23.5 mmscfd of dry gas (dew point -1 C) is supplied at a pressure of 1600 psi. Stabilised crude is exported to the FSU and produced water is treated to 40 ppm prior to overboard discharge. A water injection system provides filtered, treated and deaerated water at a rate of up to 65,000 BPD for reservoir injection (Fig. 5). A full range of production support facilities supplement the process and include gas dehydration, flare, fuel gas, chemical injection. The "Ailsa Craig" is a permanently moored tanker which has been converted to handle storage of the Emerald crude. Storage capacity is around 900 thousand barrels. The FSU is fitted with a bow mooring point arrangement which allows for a 3600 swing around the Single Point Mooring (SPM). The SPM consists of a tripod, clump block and chains, all installed on the seabed. Produced oil is transferred from the FSU storage tanks to shuttle tankers through a catenary-moored loading hose, astern of the FSU. Subsea facilities. A large proportion of the Emerald Field facilities are located subsea. P. 309

Introduction During the last decade management of safety has progressively moved from reaction to an incident towards prevention of the incident occurring. Safety management has moved from being a side-issue to being an integral part of the business to be managed in the same way as other critical issues. Incidents which in the past may have been viewed as unfortunate events are now recognised as costly and avoidable events. The principles of the management of safety risks are similar to management of health and environmental risks. Indeed the considerations are often overlapping. A combined system for management of health, safety and the environment is both more efficient and more effective than trying to manage the elements separately. An industry-recognised HSE-Management System (HSE-MS) is particularly useful in joint ventures and when working with contractors. It provides a framework within which to address the interfaces between the HSE-MS of the various partners. The E&P Forum Health, Safety and Environmental Management System (HSE-MS) Guidelines were developed to describe in one document an integrated management system based on the current best practice in the exploration and production industry. The HSE-MS adopts principles from the international standard on quality systems ISO 9000 and several successful existing upstream company systems. Why integrate HS &E management? The requirements of health and safety and of environmental protection are not always in harmony. For example, measures necessary to safeguard personnel in an emergency may have adverse environmental effects, and vice versa. However, joint consideration of health, safety and environmental matters provides a framework within which such issues can be resolved. There are four main incentives for integrated HSE management. – Considering the three elements (health, safety and the environment) together enables a balance to be struck. An integrated system ensures consideration of the interaction between these elements. – It provides a vehicle for management to set their own objectives and goals and measure performance taking corrective action where necessary, thus reducing the need for prescription and external rule-based regulation. – It requires staff at all levels to be focused on the need for a continuous effort to improve HSE performance. – There is increased emphasis from within industry, and from regulators, on the need for self-regulation and for goal setting management systems. Managing HSE should not be seen as a separate activity from managing the business as a whole. The competencies and technical requirements needed to manage HSE matters should be integrated into the day-to-day business of the company. By integrating HSE management into the business and by striving for continuous improvement of the HSE-MS, improvements in HSE performance will follow. P. 245

Abstract The development and submission of installation safety cases is an activity which has and will in the future utilise a significant level of operators' manpower. The Amerada Hess Ivanhoe/Rob Roy fields safety case was prepared and submitted initially to the HSE as an early voluntary submission for a floating production system and then as the formal safety case submission in June 1993. This paper will detail how the safety case was developed starting from the 'Forthwith Studies' defined by the Cullen Report. It will detail the various development stages of the document and the changes that were carried out before a satisfactory format was reached. A particular strength identified in the voluntary safety case was the hazard identification and mitigation section, which also includes the hazard inventory. This section will be presented in detail with examples in some of the main hazard groups, namely (i) loss of containment, (ii) dropped object, (iii) marine impact and helicopter crash, (iv) marine system faults, (v) loss of structural integrity and (vi) environmental hazards. The methods used to justly identify the hazards associated with the installation, then qualitatively risk rank and finally, perform quantified risk assessment will be presented. Detailed information on the dropped object studies will be specifically highlighted. This paper will provide an insight into the development of a safety case which has been reviewed by the HSE, as part of the voluntary safety case exercise. The sharing of the Amerada Hess experience will be of great benefit to those involved in the development of installation safety cases, particularly in the area of floating production systems. Introduction The preparation of the AH001 Safety Case commenced in early 1991 with the voluntary case being presented to the HSE in January 1992. After additional work the formal safety case was submitted in June 1993. The format of the Safety Case was initially based on the UKOOA Guidelines since at that time guidance from the HSE was not available. It was subsequently altered to the current format following review and discussion. In general we had a good starting point - the AH001. The Ivanhoe and Rob Roy fields are located in Block 15/21a - 100 miles north-east of Aberdeen in a water depth of 140 metres. The AH001 is a conversion of a Sedco 700 series semi-submersible vessel which, for the purpose of certification, is now designated a fixed floating production facility (Fig. 1). P. 325^

Wong, Norman Amoco (U.K.) Exploration Co. Abstract This paper discusses the piloting work done by Amoco (U.K.) Exploration Company, from 1988 to date, in developing safety cases for a total of 21 diverse installations in the United Kingdom sector of the North Sea. The period is characterised by an unprecedented degree of change during which operators have sought to achieve a practical and consistent outcome in anticipation of new offshore safety regulations finally introduced in 1993 [1]. The paper describes Amoco's approach to the management of that change, the formation and the work of the Amoco Safety Case Team, and the value of the information and experience obtained during the process. It concludes by discussing the key elements in the project's success and the future challenges facing the industry in continuing to implement the new approach to safety. Introduction In July 1988, an incident on an offshore installation led to the loss of 167 lives. The resulting Public Inquiry, chaired by Lord Cullen, produced a report containing 106 recommendations [2]. The central recommendation was that the operators of offshore installations should be required to prepare a safety case, and submit it to the regulator for his acceptance. A Safety Case can be defined as the document that describes the management system for safe operation of an offshore installation. It should demonstrate that all hazards have been identified and assessed, and are under control by effective safety measures so that the exposure of personnel to the hazards has been minimised. Amoco (U.K.) Exploration Company is the operator of the North West Hutton, Montrose and Arbroath oil fields; the Leman, Inde, Lomond and North Everest gas fields; and the CATS pipeline. The installations on these fields vary in size, complexity and age, ranging from large oil and gas production installations, multi-jacket gas production, terminal, processing and compression complexes, down to smaller single- jacket gas production installations that are not normally manned. In 1988 an Amoco taskforce, comprising senior engineers and safety specialists, reviewed the production operations and facilities. The team identified areas from which a series of safety enhancement studies were carried out. These qualitative studies developed into offshore modifications and in 1990 Amoco relocated 44 emergency shutdown valves (ESDVS) on pipeline risers; installed a pipeline sub sea isolation valve (SSIV); upgraded fire protection systems, and evacuation, escape and rescue facilities. This work subsequently proved a valuable source of information and ideas for the safety case development project. As operators of 21 installations it was crucial that Amoco devised a consistent approach to the development of the safety case and extended this to all our safety documentation. This would allow a sharing of useful information with a view to enhancing safety in a well structured and uniform way for all installations. AMOCO'S "CULLEN TASKFORCE" On publication of Lord Cullen's Report, Amoco established a taskforce to accelerate the responses to the recommendations. The foremost objective of the taskforce was to establish the Amoco Safety Management System as a prelude to developing a safety case for each installation. Their immediate task was to review the effectiveness of existing systems and prepare a framework for managing and monitoring safety without lessening individual responsibility for safe working. On the basis of this, the taskforce initiated a number of important changes to Amoco's approach to safety. P. 301^

McIntosh, A.M. Conoco (UK) Ltd. Introduction July 6th 1988 saw the worst disaster in the history of offshore operations. The total destruction of the Piper Alpha Platform claimed the lives of 165 of the 226 persons on board, and two of the crew of a fast rescue craft. The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster led to the publication of the so called "Cullen Report' in November 1990 containing Lord Cullen's 106 recommendations for improving or achieving optimum safety. The report was welcomed and the recommendations were quickly accepted by the UK government. Many people envisaged the report as having a radical effect on the design and construction of offshore installations, and while this is true to a point, detailed examination of Lord Cullen's recommendations show that the greatest part of these related to Safety Management. Over half his recommendations refer to management and training issues, approximately a further 25% deal with safety engineering assessment and analysis and only about 25% relate purely to hardware issues. Lord Cullen's first and overriding recommendation was that operators should be required by regulation to submit a Safety Case, similar to the CIMAH Safety Report, for each of its installations. He was firmly directing operators towards assessing and demonstrating a safe operation via the production of a Safety Case as is now required by the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 1 992 and if the operator can make that demonstration then he will have met the intention of the vast majority, if not all of, Lord Cullen's recommendations. The Safety Case must demonstrate three things: That the operator has an effective corporate and installation Safety Management System to ensure that the design and operation of the installation are safe. That the major hazards and risks to personnel have been identified, assessed, and controlled, and That should there be a major incident affecting the installation, there is adequate provision for the safe refuge of personnel pending their safe and full evacuation, escape and rescue. Lord Cullen's recommendation is dramatic in its simplicity and logic, but its implications are enormous and far reaching. HOW TO APPLY THE SAFETY CASE REGULATIONS TO THE LOGGS SYSTEM OF GAS PLATFORMS The Cullen Report was written based on the events of Piper Alpha and therefore with traditional major Northern North Sea installations in mind. P. 307^