API Specification 16A defines the requirements for design, testing, and other aspects of drill-through equipment. This includes ram and annular blowout preventers as well as connectors, spools, and adapters. The most recent edition contains changes that will drive a significant amount of rigorous testing to monogram pressure-control equipment going forward. This drill-through equipment will contain many operating system seals that are off-the-shelf but original equipment manufacturers (OEM) must also design custom seal assemblies to contain a flowing wellbore fluid. This requires optimizing the design of the assembly and selecting a compatible elastomer compound. Both steps are critical to meet performance requirements. Once designed, the prototype must undergo a battery of tests to qualify the design to API 16A. Here, formalized test standards divide equipment qualification into performance requirement (PR) levels, either PR1 or PR2. Previous editions of API 16A did not have PR levels. Laboratory evaluation of elastomer compounds and full-scale component testing may be performed to improve the final product. Lab test results include immersion testing in hydrogen sulfide while product testing at elevated temperature and pressure may be performed in a full-size blowout preventer (BOP). API 16A test standards are used by the industry to monogram the finished product. However, there are limitations in API 16A qualification tests regarding chemical compatibility. Annular and ram BOP packers and seal designs serve as examples of the technological process used to improve performance and extend service life at elevated temperatures and pressures. All testing is tied back to API 16A validation and qualification requirements.

AlMansoori has implemented Happiness as a key business theme during 2017 as one of the first companies in the private sector in the UAE. The journey of AlMansoori's Happiness implementation is described in this paper with the aim to share the learning to the fellow UAE companies to benefit from. Early results indicate that Happiness got widely embraced in the company with no resistance nor cynicism. The new culture whereby Happiness is an enabler that is on par with health, safety and quality clearly will set-up AlMansoori for a better future both business commercially and as a community of employees.

As operators move towards intelligent wells and fields, data management systems need to be adapted to support the transformation. With technology advancements and a growing network of sensors that enable faster and higher frequency data gathering, there is a need to sustainably scale data management systems to the level required to handle higher volumes of data and faster processing response. The most comprehensive systems, however, are those that support efficient decision making. A Middle Eastern operator embarked on a project to enhance the existing well integrity data management system to add new capabilities and extend the system to other fields in the Arabian Gulf. The updated well integrity management standards were also incorporated to reflect the operator's latest business principles. The system was further integrated with a geographical information system and well integrity business workflows were developed. The system automatically monitors data and sends notifications on abnormal well conditions. This is being supported by a single repository of all necessary data, historical inspection, pressure trends and well intervention histories. Through continuous monitoring of operating conditions by the system and automatic task assignment when conditions indicate the rise of well problems, engineers can work more proactively and manage a growing number of assets. Automated monitoring relieves engineers from the efforts previously exerted on manual processes and allows them to focus on the engineering analysis. Having a single repository with historical inspection, safety critical equipment test data, full pressure trends and well intervention histories, provides a wealth of information from which to make informed decisions. A benefit of having such methodology, from a management viewpoint, is that there is a common approach to well integrity indicators and key performance indicators for all assets. This allows benchmarking from field to field so that a consistent decision making approach can be made and resources of different types properly focused on those places where the challenges and demands are higher. In a period where the industry has gone through some substantial rationalization, the fact that staff can be assigned to different assets through the use of a common system with which they are familiar helps them to quickly understand, analyze and tackle well problems. This paper examines the application of intelligent software analytics and a robust system to optimize resources and enhance efficiency and performance. By collecting a wider range of data with increased frequency and applying intelligent software analytics, the operator has been able to greatly improve the asset management coverage, thus improving efficiency and performance; satisfying regulatory requirements and achieving production targets.

The objective of this paper is to discuss the successful application of a cryogenic freeze plug to fulfill the requirements of dual shutoffs prior to removing the production tree. This operation is presented as a substitute when conventional means are not feasible. The Saudi Aramco policy regarding the decompletion of wells with downhole packers requires two independent shutoff barriers for the tubing and tubing casing annulus prior to the removal of the production tree. These shutoffs must be independently and simultaneously operated. Moreover, each shutoff must be pressure tested separately. A dual shutoff is easily achievable with conventional means. That is, tubing plugs and tubing hanger back pressure valves, or a combination of the two. Prior to removing the production tree from an oil-producing well, the production tubing status was found to have collapsed and parted. With the presented conditions, the only annular barrier was the kill fluid column. The well also had leaking tubing hanger seals, which were not holding pressure. As a result, introducing an additional shutoff barrier proved challenging. An innovative practice was presented as a second shutoff application. The proposal was to utilize the cryogenic freeze plug as a solution to this event. The kill fluid column, filling the tubing and tubing casing annulus, was frozen by a cryogenic freeze plug method. This allowed the fluid to mimic the form of a second barrier. This application serves as a temporary secondary barrier that would withstand the required pressure test with a full column of kill fluid in the tubing and tubing casing annulus. This paper reviews the methodology, purpose, technique, and qualification of cryogenic freezing as a second barrier. It also supports the positive trend of technical reviews of new methods or alternative techniques for nonconventional isolation barriers or shutoffs.

The assurance of well integrity in the oil and gas fields has become a paramount responsibility during the field life cycle. Today this task represent a major challenge in the oil industry taking in consideration the rising of number of wells with extreme conditions with HPHT reservoirs, high fracture pressures, highly sour environments and subsea wells in ultra deep waters. After the catastrophic incident of Macondo in 2010, Process Safety (PS) and Well Integrity (WI), are the two major priorities of all Oil & Gas Companies, due to the potentially high financial and environmental impacts, in case a well barrier failure occur. The management of the wells barrier represents one of the main targets inside the oil industry, in order to guarantee the integrity on the oil and gas wells. New standards highlight the requirement of to guarantee two barriers all the time in order to avoid any undesirable leakage of well fluids. The policy of ensuring two barriers is mandatory, and the aim is to have available a secondary barrier in case the primary barrier fail. However, immediately after any failure in the primary barrier, is also mandatory start up an emergency plan in order to recovery the primary barrier or suspend the Well properly with two temporary barriers. The emergency plan to re-establish two well barriers normally requires some special resources and an extensive risk assessment. The first challenge after the emergency plan has been activated is how to define an adequate and safer setup for the well intervention, in order to guarantee personnel safety and the integrity of the assets. This technical paper propose a new approach for the Hydraulic Workover interventions and a workflow to enhance the Hydraulic Workover Units (HWOU) in order to make those operations safer, reliable and suitable to attend challenging interventions to restore wells with integrity issues and flexible enough and cost effective to attend conventional workovers. The idea is to develop an enhanced HWOU to compete with Rig, Hoist and CTU in different intervention scenarios. It’s presented an outline of the improvements, job analyis and the risk assessment required to define an adequate well control envelop in order to cover all the changes in the well barriers, the changes on well conditions and the expected challenges along the intervention. At the end we present the recipe to conduct the evaluation of every intervention and the tailored improvements to the intervention challenges.

Objectives/Scope Managing contractor's safety is a continuous journey full of challenges that have severely affected Abu Dhabi Onshore Oil Operations (ADCO) HSE performance and reputation in the past. To tackle these challenges where thousands of labours are involved in major projects, drilling Operations and day to day activities within the sensitive environment of Qusahwira field, south of Abu Dhabi, a proactive approach and investment of Two Hours labours workshop called "Stand down for Safety" was introduced. The main objective of this project was to demonstrate ADCO's duty of care and to show a strong and visible commitment toward labour safety from both ADCO and contractor Management; this approach was to review and analyse all the incidents that have occurred in the past followed by an action plan to avoid reoccurrence and eventually to introduce and rollout new corporate initiatives and programs to tackle challenges that will be encountered in the future using ADNOC best practices. The main challenges that were tackled successfully during this stand down were: Heat Stress: The Holy month of Ramadan was these years during summer time. Due to the criticality of the situation, a special Heat stress program was launched to avoid dehydration and heat related accidents. Road and Work Safety: Eight thousand employees were involved in drilling operations and Major projects and more than Sixty million Km were driven in remote areas using sand tracks with frequent sand storms and harsh weather. Complex drilling operations continued in remote and environmentally sensitive areas without any well control event and injuries due to implementation of barrier analytical approach. Methods, Procedures, Process During "Stand down for Safety" all labours are released from work to attend the workshop and participate in these knowledge sharing and learning events to prevent injuries. The function agenda is prepared based on labours feedback and observations in consultation with the field leadership team. This function is conducted in multiple languages to ease and ensure maximum learning is gained through interactive two way communication. The workshop is complimented by the open lunch - another opportunity for the labours and ADCO leadership team informal interaction. These workshops are supported by daily and weekly spot visits by Supervisors and management to check labours learning is being implemented and demonstrated at the work sites. Any deviation from the learning is corrected immediately on site. Results, Observations, Conclusions This novel approach was implemented and resulted in TwoYears Free of Accidents . Novel/Additive Information The difference between "Stand Down for Safety" and other workshops is that this function is conducted in multiple languages to ease and ensure maximum learning is gained through interactive two way communication. These workshops are supported by weekly spot visits by Supervisors and High profile Tours by Top management to check labours learning is being implemented and demonstrated at the work sites.

Safety culture can be distilled into nine characteristics predictive of safety outcomes. By tracking performance across these characteristics, companies can measure their performance against the world's most successful safety organizations, both within industry and without. More importantly, they can identify gaps in their culture and breakdowns in their safety performance, thereby establishing clear goals to overcoming them and achieving safety objectives. To improve safety performance and create lasting change in organizational culture, leaders can focus on developing ten safety-specific leadership capabilities. These ten capabilities characterize great safety organizations and distinguish strong safety leaders.

Offshore drilling rigs are increasingly complex integrated systems that incorporate automated software-dependent control systems to maintain safe and effective operations. Under even relatively benign conditions, software issues have caused unintended circumstances, sometimes with catastrophic results. Catastrophic incidents and unplanned downtime are reduced when such systems are based on well-defined requirements that are verified during system development and then validated to work as intended in the operational environments. Industry leaders, governments and international organizations are encouraging more stringent practices to improve offshore drilling operational safety. DNV and ABS standards, Integrated Software-Dependent System (ISDS) and Integrated Software Quality Management (ISQM), respectfully, aim to reduce the number of system and software issues through the application of standard software verification and validation (V&V) practices. The aerospace industry has a long tradition for applying such discipline. In fact, it is required when working with some government agencies, such as the NASA and the Federal Aviation Administration. These disciplines contribute to the design of complex, safe, reliable, high-performance systems that allow humans and equipment to operate in the most extreme environments on Earth and in space. Over the past 12 years, operators in the offshore drilling industry have benefited significantly through application of aerospace-based systems engineering disciplines to address a wide variety of high-value rig system safety and performance issues. These processes are most effective when included during development of new rig and subsystem designs. However, significant benefit to system safety and performance can also be achieved when these processes are incorporated as part of service life extension and subsystem upgrade projects. This paper will focus on a description of the processes and benefits to come from applying an integrated system level software requirements verification and validation approach.

Abu Dhabi National Company for Onshore Oil Operations (ADCO) is expanding their operation in terms of increasing the production quota by drilling more wells with working over the existing wells. Therefore, the demanding to increasing rig fleet and activities is one of the important milestones in Drilling Division in ADCO. It is very critical and complex challenging to mobilize and start up with new drilling rigs. This process have an impact of a high cost and risk to any Oil and Gas company's business, so all the mitigations and risks should carefully be observed, taken and planned ahead prior each stage of ADCO New Rigs Start up project. Three main stages are considered after defining the specifications of the required drilling rigs. They are (1) construction, (2) commissioning and (3) start-up. Different risks and Challenges involved in each stage of the ADCO New Rigs Start up project process such as delays during any stage of the project which have a great impact on delivering the rigs as per the planned frame work therefore, delays in delivering the company business plan. This paper will express the challenge of having delays causing high impact in company business plan, however, the higher risk is always safety related. In addition of illustrating safe start-up is always considered the priority and focus through all project stages for achieving Zero-Harm target.

This paper is going to present Communication Protocol Management Tool between Rigs in "CAT-A" Wells and the Successful Story to Deliver Sour Gas Project and using Simultaneous Operations Management Tool based on a new concept and the respective qualification program run in the Field. CAT-A; CATEGORY-A is the high risky wells, gas wells, and exploration wells has high content of H2S and CO2 We should think about Communication Protocol in SIMOPS terms of "Sharing Information Maximizes Our Personnel Safety". With this stated, a plan can be created by following a process outlined as: Communication Protocol - Study the project, Identify possible SIMOPS, Meet with all Parties Involved, Organize a Plan, and Share the plan/Information. This practice should begin at project inception and is repeated throughout the entire process until completion. Thus making the SIMOPS plan dynamic and causes communication between all parties. This Communication Protocol I in SIMOPS plan will be applicable from spud in Rigs operation and all persons likely to be working within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) during the drilling of the H2S bearing formations must be made aware of this plan and establish a means of communication with Field Control room prior to entering the zone. Based on this approach, we implemented a Communication Protocol in SIMOPS plan in one of Sour Gas Field where the Rigs needed to operate inside the emergency planning Zone (EPZ) of the third one of other project. This is one of the biggest challenges in Sour Gas Field project due to high risk encountered with high exposure of H2S up to 26% PPM and 10% CO2 in one of High Gas Reservoir Field. There were numerous challenges in terms of the harsh sour gas environment. The implementation of this particular Communication Protocol in Simultaneous Operations was very successful, several large scale exercise were made to verify the effectiveness of the process and an evacuation of the EPZ was done before entering the H2S successfully, this project and the other Rigs within the EPZ area completed the drilling and production testing operation objectives without incident and successfully with no harm.

During the past decade Vehicle Accident Frequency (VAF) has been steadily improving in an exponential way achieved a world class performance of 0.04 VAF in 2009. Following a slowdown in performance in 2010 and an alarming increase in the first quarter 2011 a new strategy was adopted to bring ADCO drilling road safety performance back to its excellent standard. Immediately following the fourth road accident in the first quarter of 2011, a workshop was organized by the Drilling Division leadership involving all drilling contractors to study the way forward and to discuss all the accidents. Each Manager whose company was involved in an accident had to present the investigation outcome and the way forward. Brainstorming followed the presentations and a plan was set in place. Part of the plan was to have a stand down for safety for two hours in all the rigs and a high-profile tour with road safety as theme to show ADCO and contractors management commitment to safety and concern with the regard to this alarming increase of accidents. All the rigs were fully shut down for two hours on the same day and mixed management teams from both ADCO and contractors visited all the rigs with the purpose to talk with rig personnel and also to show that safety takes priority over speed of operations. To further improve our safety performance and to keep our employees and contractors safe by focusing on compliance and tackling the cultural issues that can lead to unsafe behavior, ADCO Drilling Division implemented ADCO mandatory 9 Life Protection Rules (LPR). These rules reinforce what employees and contractors must know and do to prevent serious injury or fatality. Drilling Division implemented the LPR in 2012 with special focus on item 1: Road Safety. As a results of The road safety programme introduced by ADCO Drilling Division in 2012 the Vehicle Accident Frequency went sharply down reaching a world class performance of 0.1, in 2012 and zero injuries; one of the lowest in ADCO Drilling history. Using the same approach in 2013, we have recorded 0.06 VAF in ADCO remote fields: Shah (Brownfield), Qusahwira and Mender (green fields), another indication that ADCO has set a strategy that did enhance the road safety performance and can be used even in remote area with success.

A wise person once said "If you always do what you always did, you'll always get what you always got". Never was it more true than in the field of safety. More of the same approaches to safety will give organisations exactly the same outcomes. That is why many complain their safety performance appears to be stuck on a plateau. Despite all of their efforts over months and in many cases years, they are not seeing any discernible improvements. To get down the final slope towards a zero accident culture requires major changes in how companies and people approach safety in the workplace. To most managers, already besieged by deadlines, cost controls, staffing issues in an ageing workforce, national and international legislation, the idea of modifying corporate culture at the same time is perhaps a step too far. A complete change is essential if the ultimate goal is to be achieved. Society is demanding that organisations and the management of these organisations are held accountable for their safety performance. Charges of corporate manslaughter are no longer theoretical penalties, they are a fact of life. This paper discusses what is required of management to change safety behaviours and presents the results of a behavioural safety initiative which delivered tangible improvements in overall safety performance.

The PETROPARS Drilling department has developed a safety culture via SMART system in its drilling operations that employs a high level of behavior-based observations to help instill a broad based understanding of safety and hazard recognition. Senior management developed safety principles, but the day-to-day incorporation of the safety principles are coordinated by the workers themselves. This has led to a progressive improvement in safety results as the program and culture has matured. The majority of the subsurface work is conducted on offshore jack-up drilling rigs by contract drilling personnel and service companies. In order to establish the desired safety culture, core safety principles were established and communicated by management. Then safety leadership training was provided to all key workers to gain understanding and commitment. Finally a behavior-based safety observation program was adopted and modified to fit this work environment. This behavior-based program has implemented through SMART system or (See Monitor Act Reinforce Track) that covered all aspects of the offshore drilling operation. The evolution of worker participation has been far greater than originally envisioned. This paper demonstrates that safety can be improved with direct participation of the workforce in a behavior-based observation program according to PETROPARS achievement.

Abstract Oil and gas organisations face a number of EHS challenges in today's business landscape. Fatality prevention, the changing role of safety professionals, managing behavioural reliability among increasingly globalization operations, and maintaining a focus on process and personal safety are some of the most common issues we hear about. The key to responding to these challenges is to approach safety performance systemtically. The key to creating world-class safety is understanding safety and its context with the organization. Introduction Safety outcomes in oil and gas organizations, as in other industrial settings, is never a standalone proposition. The extent to which procedures are followed in the field — and to which safety enabling systems function—depend upon a complex interaction between field-level activity, and the culture, climate, and leadership of an organisation. Case studies of oil and gas industry disasters illustrate this principle well; oftentimes the action that set off a cascade of catastrophic events was rooted in cultural and organisational factors that existed for months, sometimes years, leading up to the incident. In these cases, refining the safety systems is only part of the solution. This article draws on our experience with thousands of worksites in 49 countries to suggest key elements that must be considered in creating world-class safety in oil and gas organizations. Why Safety Systems Are Not Enough Oil and gas organisations face a number of EHS challenges in today's business landscape. Fatality prevention, the changing role of safety professionals, managing behavioural reliability among increasingly globalization operations, and maintaining a focus on process and personal safety are some of the most common issues we hear about. Addressing each of these issues requires a systematic look at the fabric of the organisation itself. For example, when fatalities occur, investigations often show that they did not result from any unknown or unpredictable occurrences - rather they resulted from normalization of deviation, failure in the management of control systems, and acceptance of substandard processes. In other words, the safety systems in place were not sufficiently used. This is not to say that safety systems are not important; indeed, they are an imperative. Rather, this is to say that safety systems are not self-contained. They're subject to the same pull of activities, conditions, and events that influence other business systems. For example, the use of procedures is dependent on how they're seen in the organisation: is following them a part of how we do things here, or is it okay to let them slide once in a while?. Hazard removal is as good as the infrastructure that supports it: is it easy or hard to get this equipment replaced? The longevity of training depends on alignment with organisational priorities and practices: does my supervisor support this new way of doing things or will I meet resistance? To be effective, safety systems must be in alignment with, and supported by, other elements of the organisation. Safety systems are also tactical, rather than strategic. They directly remove exposures and enable safe work; yet they do so on behalf of a bigger objective, making a safe workplace. Few systems (if any) can do all things necessary to make this happen. No one would expect a hazard removal process to at the same time engage employees in safe work or to create a culture in which injuries are unacceptable. Just as no one would expect even the most sophisticated accounting system to make a company profitable. Safety systems thrive when they are part of the larger organisational system: when safety systems are a part of how we work and how we see ourselves. Viewed as something other than the organisation's objectives generally, safety systems can become isolated and ineffective.

Abstract The oil and gas industry prides itself on having some of the best safety records compared to many industry sectors. Health, safety and environment (HSE) became a familiar term and number one consideration in oil and gas industry. Nevertheless, traditional HSE manuals, bulletins & instructions are not enough to guarantee that the system is effective and serving the organization. Well structured safety policies, training and employee handbooks are the norm but for a safety policy to have any relevant meaning HSE values cannot remain as words on paper, they must be taken up and used by employees and translated into performance. It became mandatory to the industry to find a way to make sure that HSE instructions reach every employee and accurately implemented. This could only be achieved if proper auditing is employed. Proper auditing for a professional HSE system can definitely close the loop and fill the gap between what is written in manuals and what is eventually implemented. In the mean time, while establishing your HSE system make your reference one of the recognized international standards known to most of companies. This will make the language of your system familiar to others and help auditors when reviewing the system. Before you start, a team of experts must be formed to sponsor this task. Team members must be solicited from different company disciplines to cover all potentially hazardous areas. The team will thoroughly consider the following areas when designing the project; equipment reliability, maintenance standards, operations procedures, emergency preparedness, proper documentation and people. Introduction: Effective HSE Auditing System insures the different resources inside the company are employed efficiently. Safety manual and instructions are not enough to protect company's assets and interests. Author will use their experiences in several upstream and down stream oil and gas companies to develop a sound safety culture to develop a reliable system and design the relevant audit plans to observe proper implementation. More emphasis will be given on how to put together a professional HSE system and how to design a fit to purpose auditing system. Different examples and case studies will be highlighted to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Auditing system. The paper will also describe the international OH & safety system 18001 integrated with the Environmental Control System ISO 14001 in a one global system, taking care of the workplace safety at its widest range followed by some details on how to audit the system ensuring effective and smooth implementation. Scope: The success of any new management system has several aspects but the main is the top management commitment. It has been found that regular follow up by Line Management is a key ingredient in improving risk records. Methods of promoting education, measuring compliance with standards and evaluating progress are used by supervisors with encouraging results. In the meantime, several audits are still identifying many inconsistencies in the overall approach to HSE management at the work site. The company main operating risks differ from division to another. Training needs vary, emergency response procedures may be conflicting, and even HSE statistics are not always comparable.

Abstract This paper will examine the management issues, safety concerns of planning and executing a high end underbalanced drilling project. The discussion will include general safety, training, equipment, and conclusions. Underbalanced drilling is inherently more dangerous than conventional drilling but the danger is mitigated by proficient project management, specifically, planning, training and the operational procedures followed during execution. Statistically, underbalanced drilling is still a very small percentage of worldwide drilling operations. This trend is changing as this disruptive technology is becoming more and more accepted throughout the industry. Our biggest challenge in the future will be to ensure that the past history of no major incidents or accidents attributed to Underbalanced drilling continues. The planning that goes into an underbalanced drilling operation is more extensive than the planning of a conventionally drilled well. Some of the tools used in the planning phase of underbalanced operations include hazard identification (HAZID), hazard and operability (HAZOP), detailed operational procedures, and drawings such as equipment layout drawings (ELD), process flow diagram (PFD), valve numbering diagram (VND) and a hazardous area drawing (HAD). These processes contribute considerably to reducing the time and cost of engineering the underbalanced drilling program. Introduction Project management is a set of processes, systems and techniques for effective planning and control of resources necessary to complete the project. These processes, systems and techniques should not only focus on the resources but should also include the control of hazards associated with UBD operations. Suitable project management will not only enhance the safety of the underbalanced program but will also reduce the overall cost of the project. This is more evident if the program calls for a multi-well effort. A step by step approach to these types of projects begins by identifying the needs of the customer. The earlier the project manager can be assigned, the sooner the drilling program can be executed. Clearly defining the objectives of the customer is one of the project manager's first duties. These duties often include: Conduct UBD operations safely and minimize impact on the environment. Prove that UBD is a technology that brings added value, by accelerating production and increasing recoverable reserves. Gather UBD performance data which will be incorporated in the future drilling plan. Gain experience on UBD operations and further develop the technology for the customer. Maintain an underbalanced condition throughout operations and the completion. Fast track planning and execution of the project. Evaluation of the reservoir's inflow performance based on an analogous well drilled conventionally in the same field. Measurement of the reservoir characteristics while drilling. As early as possible, the proposed well plan and any offset well data must be reviewed. Preliminary HSE considerations and customer HSE requirements often can be identified. Different project management activities are employed during phases in the UBD project. Three main phases are: Planning Execution Review and closeout A safe approach to underbalanced project management should follow an industry accepted management system model. Management Systems Management systems should, first and foremost, comply with ISO 9001 standards. The system should take in the contents of this paper, link it to the customer, and connect back to the management system for initiation of improvement. A high-quality management system is designed to meet operations, quality, and HSE management system needs. Consequently, a high performing management system is customer focused and driven.

Abstract NDC has very successfully implemented an Unsafe Act (UA), Unsafe Condition (UC) and Near Miss (NM) reporting system. Over 20,000 reports are currently generated per year from the twenty four rigs which NDC own and operate. These UA, UC and NM reports are reactive. Hence two additional systems, Behavioural Safety Auditing (BSA) & CHECK have recently been implemented. These provide a proactive input to prevent future NMs. In addition NDC are currently developing the SAP network to provide on-line HSE event tracking. This paper presents how three systems can be run in parallel to provide comprehensive rig site risk awareness coverage. It describes how a multiple system approach to risk awareness avoids gaps and a reporting network allows all sites access to all reports. Introduction NDC is an acronym for the National Drilling Company which is one of the largest offshore and onshore drilling contractors in the Middle East. NDC is a 100% subsidiary of Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) and operates in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. The current NDC fleet comprises 9 jack-up rigs (plus 2 sub-let jack-ups from Noble Drilling), 15 large land rigs (with another currently being built) and 6 water well rigs. Three of the existing land rigs were delivered within the last year. These new rigs use technology which is applied to drill deep deviated wells from pads. This technology application won a recent prestigious local award for innovation. The paper describes risk awareness systems used on the 9 jack up rigs and existing 15 land rigs which are all owned and operated by NDC. Near Miss (NM) Reporting Currently NDC use the Near Miss report (see Attachment 1) to report NMs + UAs + UCs. "Real" Near Misses (i.e. those incidents where some action could have caused an accident) represent less than 10% of the total. The total reports received (NM + UA + UC) has been increasing steadily from around 6000 in 1999 to 16,000 in 2002 and an expected 23,000 in 2003 (see Attachment 2). The target is two per rig per day but some rigs submit up to 5 reports per day. For the onshore rigs there is also a target of 10 reports per rig move and 10 per month from Service Company (rather than NDC staff). Quality of Reports With so many reports it was necessary to separate out the more serious reports. In 2001 the Incident Potential Matrix (IPM), see Attachment 3, was introduced for all NDC accidents. In 2002 every NDC HSE event had to be given a IPM rating. The IPM ranking gives a qualitative value for each HSE event. Attachment 3 shows the distribution of the IPM rating for reports submitted during December 2002. Normally actions from the lower rated IPM reports are handled directly by the reporting rig. The high rated event and incidents (i.e. those in the orange or red areas, mostly IPM 3+ events) are fully investigated and actions implemented across all the rig fleet. NDC wanted to ensure the reports were coming from across the complete workforce. Hence each report is required to give the Reporter's name or job title. This enables NDC to see the distribution of the reports across the full workforce. As might be expected the majority of reports come from the senior rig staff. NDC has though found that junior staff across all functions are involved (see Attachment 4). Tracking As the number of reports increased, analysis and control of actions became more difficult. NDC had been looking for a computerized tracking system. During 2002 SAP modules was installed throughout NDC. All materials are now ordered directly from the rig site via SAP.

This paper was prepared for presentation at the 1999 SPE/IADC Middle East Drilling Technology Conference held in Abu Dhabi, UAE, 8–10 November 1999.

This paper was prepared for presentation at the 1999 SPE/IADC Middle East Drilling Technology Conference held in Abu Dhabi, UAE, 8–10 November 1999.

Abstract It has been proven through laboratory experiments that the three types of gas migration through a cemented annulus can be eliminated by designing the correct cement mixture. The first type of void and, therefore, gas migration can occur between the casing and the cement. By adding the correct amounts of magnetite to the cement, this void, and therefore the possible cause of gas migration, can be eliminated. The second possible type of void generation is between the cement and the borehole wall where the filter cake formed at the borehole wall adversely affects the bonding process. By using a special material, Anchorage Clay, this bonding can be improved to the extent that the gas migration between the borehole and the cement can be eliminated. The third and most complicated process is the pressure changes appearing in the cement during the setting phase. A double sinus wave pressure response during this setting time generates fractures in the microstructure of the cement. The correct amount of water as well as retarders is crucial for the best results during the dehydration process of the cement. By adding the correct type of elastomers, this pressure variation during the setting of the cement can be eliminated. Elastomers are known to counter-react the pressure behavior during the setting process. This eliminates the pressure variations and, therefore, the micro cracks. The three above mentioned effects are strong functions of temperature and pressure, and the cement design for a well would have to be carefully planned since a well has both a temperature and pressure gradient with depth. This paper discusses the individual components necessary for gas-leak elimination and gives a quantitative field example where all the correct additive volumes have been designed as a function of depth. The paper gives a clear guideline for designing the total elimination of gas migration during a cement job. In addition, this paper clearly addresses all the gas migration problems related to cementing operations. Introduction Cement slurry passes through two cycles of building its structure during the gelation period. Figure 1 shows a schematic of the duration of the first and second cycles of the total gelation time. in the first cycle, the cement slurry builds itself with time in a three-dimensional structure (thixotropic behavior). However, in some local areas, this structure collapses, releasing some trapped water. This situation takes place mainly in the presence of tight formations. When cement faces porous formation the preflush cement loses part of its water to the formation as a spurt filtrate. This results in an incomplete cement-water reaction. The cement cake in the spurt loss area is the weakest part of the cement since it did not receive enough water to complete the reacton. The microcracks will first appear in the spurt loss area even though filtrate control materials are used with the cement. Temperature and pressure are the two physical properties that contribute to the final cement setting. The effect of temperature has the most impact on the interface between the casing and the cement. Similarly, pressure affects the setting of the cement slurry that undergoes a phase transition from liquid to solid. P. 263^