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Keywords: betray
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Proceedings Papers
Game Theory for the Maritime Professional
Available to Purchase
Paper presented at the SNAME Maritime Convention, October 22–24, 2014
Paper Number: SNAME-SMC-2014-T56
... again in Round 5. Other varieties of Tit-for-Tat have more or less forgiving policies. Tit-for-Two-Tats is a more forgiving strategy where Player A only betrays after Player B betrays twice. Conversely, a trigger strategy starts off cooperating, but will never cooperate again after a betrayal. See...
