This paper analyzes the causes of recent accidents associated with production operations on the U.S. OCS. The results indicate that few accidents and no deaths were caused by insufficient quality control in the manufacture and maintenance of safety devices or by the lack of an adequate number of safety devices. Most accidents were related to poor operating practices, inadequate safety training or human error.
The safety of producing operations in the U.S. Outer Conti nenta1 Shelf (OCS) is defined by law and regulation to be the responsibility of the operating oil company. The American Petroleum Institute (API) has developed a series of design guidelines and recommended practices to assure that operations are conducted in a safe manner by trained personnel and to minimize the likelihood of endangering life or damaging the environment. The Mi nera1s Management Service (MMS) of the U. S. Department of the Interior has promulgated rules and regulations incorporating these documents and added additional provisions. In addition, the MMS provides for annual announced safety inspections and periodic surprise inspections of facilities to assure compliance with the rules.
This system is generally considered by the industry to have worked well. We have not had the type of major accidents which occurred prior to the development of the current system in the early 1970's and the accident rate is generally perceived to be low. However, it is appropriate to question the assumptions of fifteen years ago in the light of experience with this system to see if further reductions in accidents are possible. In addition, there is a possibility that the following trends might lead to a growth in accident frequency unless greater attention is paid to safety:
Many of our structures are old. As shown in Figure 1, the average age of platforms is almost 15 years and approximately 20% are 25 years or older. The rate of platform removal (approximately 50 per year) is about half the rate at which platforms were installed in the 1960's (approximately 100 per year). Thus, we can expect the number of older structures to grow in the near term.
The number of companies operating 1eases on the OCS has grown dramatically. There were 64 operators in 1980 and by 1988 that number had grown to 123. Typically, the operators who manage only a small number of 1eases do not have 1arge in-house engineering and safety staffs. Many of them use contract operators and do not have in-house programs to assure adequate operator training.
Large accidents occur when an industry gets complacent about its accident record.
The purpose of this paper is to review the history of development of the current system, analyze the accident experience to see if the system is addressing the correct issues, and discuss potential areas for improvement.
