While History may not Repeat Itself, It Often Rhymes: Evolution of Offshore Technical Process Safety Available to Purchase

The 6th July 1988 explosion and fires on the Piper Alpha platform in the North Sea initiated a review and fundamental change to the offshore safety culture in the UK. A large part of this culture change was related to the use and application of risk assessments in the management of offshore major accident hazards. The 2010 Deepwater Horizon event can be seen as a repeat of a major accident event triggering a major review and update to safety culture, this time to US OSC operations. The European operations have adopted and developed risk-based performance requirements, thought of as ‘goal set’, compared to the focus on use of industry standards and compliance in the US OCS (Outer Continental Shelf) operations, thought of as ‘prescriptive’. This perception is not strictly correct but does indicate the emphasis that the two areas operate under. This paper shows how UK Offshore risk assessments still have to show use of good practice, but depending on the nature of the specific installation there is the flexibility to identify, assess and specify required measures that may be deemed beyond good practice. This has developed into a range of technical risk assessments that model in more detail, when required, the extent, severity and consequences of offshore hazards and the required performance of measures to prevent, detect, control, mitigate and allow successful escape from these hazards.