In the event of offshore oilfield blow-out, real-time quantification of both spilled volume, recovered oil and environmental damage is essential. It is due to costly recovery and restoration process. In order to develop a robust and accurate quantification, we need to consider numerous parameters, which are sometimes tricky to be identified and captured. In this work, we present a new modeling technique under uncertainty, which accommodates numerous parameters and interaction among them. We begin the model by identifying possible parameters that contributes to the process: grouped into (1) subsurface, (2) surface and (3) operations. Subsurface e.g. well and reservoir characteristics. Surface e.g. ocean, wind, soil. (3) Operations e.g. oil spill treatment blow-out rate, oil characteristics, reservoir characteristics, ocean current speed, meteorological aspects, soil properties, and oil-spill treatment (oil booms and skimmers). We assign prior distribution for each parameter based on available data to capture the uncertainties. Before progressing to uncertainty propagation, we construct objective response (amount of recovered oil) through mass conservation equation in data-driven and non-intrusive way, using design of experiment and regression-based method. We propagate uncertainties using Monte Carlo simulation approach, where the result is presented in a distribution form, summarized by P10, P50, and P90 values. This work shows how to robustly calculate the amount of recovered oil under uncertainty in the event of offshore blow out. There are several notable challenges within the approach: 1) determining the uncertainty range in blow-out rate in case of rupture occurs in the well, 2) obtaining data for wind and ocean current speed since there is an interplay between local and global climate, and 3) accuracy of capturing the shoreline geometry. Despite the challenges, the results are in-line with the physics and several recorded blow-out cases. Through sensitivity analysis with Sobol decomposition, we can define the heavy hitters. These heavy hitters give us knowledge on which parameters should be aware of. In real-time quantification, this analysis can provide an insight on what treatment method should be performed to efficiently recover the spill. We also highlight about the sufficiency of the model to obtain several parameters’ range, for example blow-out rate. The model should at least capture the physics in high details and incorporate multiple scenarios. In the case of blow-out rate, we extensively model the well completion and consider leaking due to unprecedented fractures or crater formation around the wellbore. We introduce a new framework of modeling to perform real-time quantification of offshore oil spills. This framework allows inferring the causality of the process and illustrating the risk level.

Safety Critical Elements (SCEs) are the equipment and systems that provide the foundation of risk management associated with Major Accident Hazards (MAHs). A SCE is classified as an equipment, structure or system whose failure could cause or contribute to a major accident, or the purpose of which is to prevent or limit the effect of a major accident. Once the SCE has been ascertained, it is essential to describe its critical function in terms of a Performance Standard. Based on the Performance Standard, assurance tasks can be stated in the maintenance system to ensure that the required performance is confirmed. By analyzing the data in the maintenance system, confidence can be gained that all the SCEs required to manage Major Accidents and Environmental Hazards are functioning correctly. Alternatively, corrective actions can be taken to reinstate the integrity of the systems if shortcomings are identified. This paper shall detail out how the MAH and SCE Management process is initiated to follow the best industry practices in the identification and integrity management of major accident hazards as well as safety critical equipment. The tutorial shall describe in detail the following important stages: Identification of Major Accident Hazards Identification of Safety Critical Equipment, involved in managing Major Accident Hazards Define Performance Standards for these Safety Critical Equipment Execution of the Assurance processes that maintain or ensure the continued suitability of the SCE Equipment, and that these are meeting the Performance Standards Verification that all stages have been undertaken, any deviations being managed and thus that Major Accident Hazards are being controlled. Analyze and Improve Through the diligent application of these stages, it is possible to meet the requirements for MAH and SCE Management process giving a better understanding and control of risks in the industry.

Subsea blowout preventer (SBOP) reliability is a major challenge in Deepwater Drilling & Completion operations, accounting for one of the major equipment failures and Non-Productive Time (NPT) costs yearly. This paper focuses on SBOP technological advancement since the Deepwater Horizon/Macondo incident in 2010, with additional emphasis on reliability, equipment condition monitoring and statistical root cause analysis. After finishing a deepwater well, the SBOP must undergo maintenance, repair if needed and pressure testing before being deployed on the next well. The rig owner is under great pressure to complete this turn-around to avoid waiting time. On an average, in-between wells, rig contractor took approximately 2.6 days extra time (NPT) waiting after completing top hole to get ready to deploy SBOP during 2019-20 exploration and appraisal campaigns. This can be critical during development campaigns where number of rig moves are involved quickly or in cases where top holes are batch drilled the waiting time for SBOP readiness can be as high as 7-8 days per well. Some operators are collaborating with drilling contractors in number of ways to arrange for a second fully assembled and (offline) pressure tested SBOP to be available on the rig (Dual SBOP); deployment of additional trained subsea engineers for performing maintenance/repair. SBOP pressure-testing time can also be drastically reduced by using comparative pressure-testing software to eliminate human error and accelerate pressure testing. Furthermore, leak detection time can be eliminated by installing sensors, and real-time test monitoring providing increased reliability with the additional advantages that conditional monitoring can be enhanced with the same digital sensors. SBOP dashboard that simplifies existing diagnosis and allow remote monitoring of the subsea SBOP control system will improve communication of SBOP health also serve common platform across rig fleets that allow standardization of SBOP diagnostic data and aids in operational decision making Ensuring additional SBOP redundancy especially while operating Emergency Disconnect System (EDS) available through Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) control panel or acoustic system. In addition, it is mandatory for the SBOP to have Autoshear and Deadman systems to be able to shut in the well in case of an emergency. Furthermore, technological workshop with several major service vendors have being held to ascertain current advances like Multifunctional profile, Accumulator recharged by ROV, ROV DP system, An Auxiliary Accumulator System and upgraded Acoustic System. In the end, the development of new technologies applied for the SBOP targets the overall cost optimization of the well lifecycle but also assure SBOP functionality. This paper is intended to provide considerations for operators in developing their future campaigns to frame scope of work for SBOP and rig contracting strategy.

The Unconventional Resources (UR) Gas Operations has recently been developed to deliver the first unconventional production to its customers, to produce, process and pipeline gas to satisfy energy demand and support the potential future development, and reduce the liquid burning at power generation facilities. This organization handles unique, scattered and unmanned facilitates, where each facility operates differently based on the geographical nature of the field. For start-up, best practices were leveraged from for Unconventional Gas companies around the world. This includes reviewing and incorporating latest technologies to meet the business challenges of unconventional gas at the lowest cost, and most importantly, safest operations. As a new operating organization, UR Gas Operations had to define their major processes for achieving the objective of delivering customer expectations safely. These processes include the implementation of a Safety Management System (SMS) to enable control and management over plant safety, maintenance and reliability. With the help of advanced digitalization, SMS processes are being automated to maximize their effectiveness and efficiency. SMS acts as one platform that integrate the safety processes of different facilities under one umbrella. Furthermore, SMS is a critical pillar of Operational Excellence, it involves a set of defined processes that are measured through KPIs to comply with the company's safe operations which was named "SMS Online" Developing SMS Online have a positive impact on two key stakeholders in UR; Gas Operations Engineers, and Gas Operations Management. The SMS Online is a visualization platform for the safety performance KPIs across the UR Gas Operation organization. Hence SMS enforces accountability for proper KPI tracking and reporting, with compliance to safety processes. In addition, SMS Online creates an environment that supports engineers with their daily safety revisions, tracking, guidance, etc. This portal has increased the accessibility to safety processes across the organization by having a friendly user interface that navigates through SMS elements and processes. The system also provides an automated tracking system for assigning and managing action items assigned against individuals that alert actionees for closing an item prior to the deadline through an alerts and notification system. In a majority of the industrial facilities around the world, there is a big gap between building a new facility and being fully developed Business Operating Company. A comprehensive vision and a check list of essential Information Technology and Operational Technology systems was put in place to support business readiness for safe and efficient plant start up. SMS Online was a key component of this strategy, which was developed in-house by the UR IT as the first automated safety management system in the UR.

The maritime world has been facing difficulty "last mile" logistic dilemmas of natural/manmade access barriers, lack of infrastructure, shallow waters, elevated sea states, adverse weather conditions (e.g., storms, foggy/misty, lightlessness, windy, stormy, or icy/snowy), unknown bathymetry, etc. The industries facing such dilemma have included (1) offshore petroleum exploration/production; (2) offshore mining other than petroleum; (3) marine pollution abatement; (4) humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR); (5) offshore firefighting and search and rescue (SAR); (6) offshore energy generation, storage and transmission; and (7) military sectors. A new breed of Autonomous Maritime ISO-Container Vehicles (AMISOC Vehicles) has been invented for effectively solving the above decade-old "last mile" logistic dilemmas. Another dilemma also facing the maritime industries is the ship-to-ship, ship-to-platform or platform-to-ship transfer of cargos at sea. These cargo transfer operations at sea are expensive, difficult to perform and risky which have plagued reliable, efficient and cost-effective sustainment of offshore petroleum exploration/production platforms under adverse weather periods and/or at elevated sea states (e.g., >3+). To be more fully presented in this paper hereinafter, unique and innovative autonomous/unmanned vehicles that are container-box based (or AMISOC vehicles) and their companion technology known as in-situ launch and recovery devices (LRDs) (remotely controllable) have been invented to inexpensively and reliably solve the above critical maritime dilemmas offshore.

The Macondo blow-out in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, and the earlier Montara incident in Australia, led the entire oil and gas industry to review both drilling safety and oil spill preparedness. As a result, the International Oil and Gas Producers Association (IOGP) established a multi-year programme to embed the learning from these and similar incidents, and to enhance future prevention and preparedness. This presentation provides an overview of the latest practical tools that can be used by operators to improve their emergency and spill response plans.

KOC has focused on Asset Integrity Management System (AIMS) & HSE Management System to enhance process safety & prevent Process Safety Management related incidents & spills. AIMS implementation in KOC facilities started a decade ago & KOC has developed a new PSM group in 2015 to focus on process safety while HSE Group has enhanced the personal safety system / standards / procedures. KOC strives to achieve sustainable Operations Excellence to ensure the followings: (1) PSM incidents are systematically analyzed to identify Root Causes & Critical Factors, (2) Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are implemented with controls in place to prevent recurrence & monitor progress. The overall AIMS system comprises (1) well integrity, (2) pipeline integrity and (3) facility integrity with focus on PSM system at present. While the company's HSE management system is more focused on personal & occupational safety, environment protection & behavioural-based safety (BBS), the AIMS/PSM aspiration is to imbed inherent safety in the project design cycle, manage the safety critical equipment (SCE) and aim for sustainable Operations Excellence. Operational Excellence is at the heart of KOC commitment to HSSE and is integrated & not separate. It also includes a comprehensive Behavioral Based Safety (BBS) implemented in all assets to identify & correct the human error aspects which can emerge as critical factors leading to incidents. The AIMS system implementation commenced under HSE umbrella and is focused on process safety management system (PSM) with relevant policy and procedures. Company operational assets include Wells, Flow lines, Manifolds, Gathering Centres (GC), Booster Stations (BS), Pipelines corridors, Tank Farms, Export & Marine Facilities . Planned Preventive Maintenance (PM) and Inspection & Corrosion activities involve RBI (Risk Based Inspection) of static equipment and RCM (Reliability Centred Maintenance) for rotating machinery.

This paper illustrates how significant improvements were implemented for SHE&S (Safety, Health, Environment and Security) performance by Descon; a site Subcontractor organisation on the RasGas executed Barzan Onshore Project. Under contract to JGC, the project's primary EPC (Engineering, Procurement and Construction) contractor, Descon's work scope was to construct the Common Process South and Offsite facilities which have been completed. At the outset of the project, Descon aligned their SHE&S (Safety, Health, Environment and Security) Management System with JGC's SHE&S management system, which is based on the EPC SHE&S contractual requirements provided by RasGas. However, in the early days of the project, Descon was incurring incidents at a frequency greater than the other seven subcontractors and also experienced the project's first Lost Time Incident (LTI) in July 2012. The paper evaluates the management system tools and practical actions that drove and sustained improvement of Descon's SHE&S management. In response to incidents which had occurred, in the second half of 2012, Descon management made significant changes to their programme - including improvements to: SHE&S and craft training programmes; the site organisation; site SHE&S campaigns; enforcement of site SHE&S policies and procedures; and worker recognition. The improvements were also driven by various IIF (Incident and Injury Free) activities for ongoing engagement with the workers at the worksite and in the camps including: IIF site walks; social camp visits and management lunches with the workers; various camp sports; and educational and cultural activities. The improvement actions were captured within action plans, and key indicators were selected to monitor and measure the success of the programme. Since the July 2012 LTI and SHE&S programme overhaul, Descon established and sustained a positive safety culture with the workers and supervisors; worked 31 million man-hours without any additional LTIs; and clearly demonstrated leadership and innovation for SHE&S improvement on the project. This paper addresses how these improvements were accomplished and the actions that made these SHE&S programme improvements sustainable. In summary, positive initiatives and actions taken by Descon ensured that the fundamentals of a SHE&S Management System were executed consistently and sustainably, with strong management commitment and buy-in by the workers and supervisors.

The risk of operating and managing major hazard facilities is not a new one. Major accidents such as the Deepwater Horizon (Macondo), Piper Alpha, British Petroleum (BP) Texas City refinery, Longford refinery have led to a review of current practices and regulations. Subsequent to the recent events, there have been discussions regarding the merits of a Major Accident Hazard analysis (Safety Case approach) and there have been comparisons with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA's) Process Safety Management approach. RasGas is evaluating incorporating a Safety Case approach within the RasGas Elements of Excellence (the RasGas Safety Management System Framework). Precedence is being taken from the various international regulations such as the European Seveso directive, Risk assessment regulations - Norway, Control of Major Accident Hazard (COMAH) regulations – United Kingdom (UK), and the Major Hazard Facility Regulations - Australia wherein a safety case approach has been adopted. RasGas has evaluated the benefits of integrating the existing Health, Safety and Environmental (HSE) Management Systems with the Safety Case approach. This paper demonstrates the integration of various safety case elements/processes (with existing elements of the Company's HSE Management System. The topics discussed in this paper will be relevant to all organizations with mature HSE management systems and are in the process of migrating towards a Major Accident Hazard analyses/ Safety case framework.

Managing the effect of a serious incident requires access and understanding of many types of information. For an effective and coordinated response to an incident a shared, common picture of the situation is essential. A common picture of reality is required by various organizations that look with different lenses to the incident so they all can collectively respond to it, in order to safe lives, environment and reputation. A Common Operating Picture (COP) is a computing platform based on Geographical Information System (GIS) technology that provides this single source of data and information for situational awareness, coordination and communication to support emergency management and response personnel and other stakeholders involved in or affected by an incident. The situational awareness provided by a COP is fundamental in the understanding of the relevant social, economic, environmental and logistic aspects of the (potential) incident. This paper explains how Shell is currently implementing a COP for all its major operations.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has promulgated regulations governing the detection and repair of equipment leaks that cause fugitive emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOC). These regulations are embedded in various emission standards and are generally referred to as Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR) programs. The primary method used currently in the U.S. to detect leaks is EPA Method 21. 1 Method 21 requires operators to use portable instruments, typically a Flame Ionization Detector (FID) or a Photon Ionization Detector (PID), to "sniff" around the circumference of individual equipment components (e.g., valves, flanges, pump seals, etc.) 2 . If the detector reading (parts per million or PPM) is higher than target thresholds, the component is deemed to be leaking and it must be repaired within a certain time. Fugitive VOC emissions from a facility are calculated based upon the PPM readings (referred to as screening values or SVs) and empirical correlations between SVs and mass emission rates. 2 Because the leak check is performed on each individual component basis, the implementation of a Method 21 based LDAR program is tedious, labor intensive, and prone to errors. Optical gas imaging (OGI) technology has been developed and can be used to detect VOC leaks from process equipment. The OGI technology allows operators to use a specially designed Infrared (IR) video camera to see VOC plumes leaking from components that are not visible to the naked eye. Detecting VOC leaks using OGI is more efficient than Method 21 because leak checking using OGI is visual, making detection faster, and can be performed over an area instead of component-by-component. The OGI method allows operators to detect larger leaks easily and more frequently, achieving the same environmental benefit with a lower cost. For this reason, the OGI method is also referred to as "Smart LDAR". In December 2008, U.S. EPA promulgated the "Alternative Work Practice" (AWP) rule allowing operators to use OGI for LDAR compliance. 3 However, the AWP rule requires operators to continue to perform leak checks using Method 21 at least once a year. Although OGI can be very effective in detecting leaks, it does not provide a quantitative measure of leak rate. This has been one of the shortcomings of OGI from a regulatory perspective, thereby hindering its adoption as a true alternative to Method 21. This paper describes development of quantitative OGI (QOGI) technology. Existing OGI camera technology is the basis the new GOCI technology. If an OGI camera detects a leak, then, the operator can apply the new QOGI technology quantify the mass leak rate from the captured video images.

Abstract Do we need a journey through the past to make our future better? Many companies say they have a Lessons Learned processas part of their management system. Whilst the intent is sincere, a review of major accident events suggests this is notworking. Why is there no sense of anxiety around this failure to learn and prevent reoccurrence? From a review of variousmajor incidents around the world, we conclude that all possible lessons have not been learned from preceding events. In one sense, a failure to learn is understandable. Since catastrophic accidents are not common, it is easy for people to believe that similar incidents won't happen to them. Their rarity also means that the generation who were in proximity to a major incident and were deeply affected by it, will in time move on. Trevor Kletz recognised this issue many years ago in his 1993 book, "Lessons from Disaster" or "How organisations have no memory and accidents recur." (Kletz 1993) However, is this too pessimistic a view? What can we do about building more risk aware organisations and minimising reliance on active risk mitigation systems? Much work has been done already, mainly in the field of identifying lessons to be learnt. This is not the same as actually learning the lessons, which is more difficult. We discuss the mechanisms at work which causes lessons not to be learned along with the various psychological characteristics and traits at play that can affect our ability to learn. This paper discusses the following essential features of an effective lessons learnt process: A requirement to look outside the organisation and industry for sharing of lessons to learned; A process which goes beyond identifying the lessons to be learnt but has a method to embed or internalise the lessons and actually minimise the risk or eliminate the defect; A specific organisational capability in making changes with senior management patronage; Measurement to check the organisation is applying the lessons and behaviours and hardware have changed in practice.

Abstract Health, Safety, and Environment (HSE) management systems have evolved through lessons learned from near misses, incidents, and accidents over the years. Often, these incidents/accidents occur because of equipment damage, faulty procedures, or human negligence. While equipment damage can be repaired and procedures corrected, human oversight cannot be easily controlled. Individuals are unique, and so is their approach toward HSE. Organizations with robust safety management systems will help ensure that personnel are trained to identify and mitigate HSE risks. Despite this effort, accidents still occur, providing a continuous source of lesson learned. One approach to averting HSE risks caused by human error is to help ensure a robust design process that is centered on HSE requirements. This paper describes features of a laboratory that contains equipment and chemicals used in the oil and gas industry. The safety features discussed include access to enter this laboratory by authorized/trained personnel only and equipment designed with inherent safety features, thereby limiting exposure to most HSE risks. All of the laboratory equipment pieces are designed with double safety features, which help ensure their fail-safe function. Chemicals are also managed using a software program designed to warn the user about chemical expiration dates. The laboratory equipment testing is controlled through a software program designed to warn the user of a particular danger or potential disaster. A HSE institutionalized organization aims for continuous improvement. A forward step is to design software programs that warn the user of a particular danger and prevent the user from continuing with such actions, in addition to using intelligent chemical management software programs that identify expired chemicals and prevent their use until appropriate actions are taken. Introduction HSE management systems are a statutory requirement in the oil and gas industry. The key to a successful HSE management system is continual improvement. An effective HSE management system becomes an integral part of every management initiative by continually applying lessons learned. This involves commitment from senior management to personally lead the effort and includes participation by all levels of employees in a company's drive to achieve zero incidents and accidents (Madkour 2000). Thus, the primary responsibility for the safety of personnel and the work environment lies with the individuals in the organization, irrespective of their field of work or position. Despite these efforts, accidents still occur, often leading to new or revised procedures to help prevent similar incidents in the future (Misra 2012). Principal Sources of Incidents and Accidents According to the Abnormal Situation Management (ASM) consortium, the three principal sources of abnormal situations are people, equipment, and processes (ASM Consortium 2014). The ASM consortium is a research and development group founded in 1994 by Honeywell to identify problems facing industrial plant operations during abnormal conditions and to develop solution concepts (ASM Consortium 2014). These principal sources of abnormalities (i.e., degraded or failed equipment, process complexity, and unwarranted and unwanted human actions) are the cause for most incidents or accidents. As long as people, equipment, and processes are involved in an activity, HSE risks invariably will be present. Fig. 1 indicates the contribution of each of these sources to abnormal situations.

Abstract The Barzan Gas Project is being developed by Barzan Gas Company Limited, a joint venture between Qatar Petroleum and ExxonMobil Barzan Limited, with RasGas Company Limited as the developer and operator. The project's objective is the economic development of a high quality, reliable and fully integrated sales gas facility that further monetizes Qatar's North Field resources to supply gas to the domestic market for power generation and water desalination. JGC was awarded the Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC) contract for the Barzan Onshore Project on January 1, 2011 for design, procurement, and construction of two of the largest natural gas processing trains in the world. The workforce on site has peaked with 29,500 workers from 45 countries representing 20+ languages. The project has displayed world-class Safety, Health, Environment and Security (SHE&S) performance due in part to its SHE&S Management System. For the EPC phase, the current Lost Time Incident Rate (LTIR) is 0.006 and Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR) is 0.169 based on 195 million man-hours worked as of October 1, 2014. Only six (6) Lost Time Incidents (LTI) have occurred project to date. Between July 11, 2012 and March 25, 2014, the project attained 130 million man-hours without an LTI. The paper provides an overview of four (4) areas that have significantly contributed to the success of the project. The areas include emergency response and coordination; medical management; man-machine interface and heat stress management. Although the areas are standard in most projects of this scale, the organisation, effectiveness and level of implementation are very unique, with pioneering work being done in certain elements within these areas.

Abstract To test the improved blow-out response capabilities implemented following the Deep Water Horizon accident which took place in 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico, Total E&P Angola (The Affiliate) was chosen by Total H.Q. (The Company) to organize and run a large exercise. The objective was to check the ability to efficiently define, implement and manage the response to a major oil spill resulting from a subsea blow-out, including the mobilization of a new Sub Sea Dispersant Injection device – SSDI kit from Oil Spill response Ltd (OSRL-Norway). After one year and a half of preparation in collaboration with the Angolan Authorities, the exercise took place from the 13th to the 15th November 2013, based on a blow-out scenario of 50,000 bopd. In Luanda, the Affiliate emergency response organization was mobilized together with the Angola National Incident Command Team, as well as the Company Crisis Team in Paris. Various monitoring and modeling techniques were compared, using an authorized crude oil discharge at sea : e.g. direct observations from helicopter, OSRL aircraft, new Observation Balloon, slick tracking with drifters and interpreted RADAR satellite imagery, 5 days/3D modeling of oil fate and behavior using the modeling SPILL WATCH service. Overall results obtained proved consistent despite of the fact that modeling of surface currents is still not fully reliable. The SSDI kit was shipped by plane from Norway and successfully tested in deep offshore. On the surface, dispersion, containment and recovery operations were implemented. The onshore strategy encompassed protection of sensitive sites, shoreline clean-up, oily waste and oiled wildlife management, as well as liaising with local communities and claims management. To sustain the response, complex logistical support was also planned. Owing to the ambitious objectives, variety of operations, level of mobilization in Angola and in France, implication of the Angolan authorities and considering over 500 persons were safely involved in the operations, LULA is a unique exercise and proved to be a great success. Lessons learnt will serve to improve blow-out response capability, but also oil spill response and emergency management capabilities not only within the Company, but also for the benefit of other oil operators, support companies and the National Authorities.

Abstract Crises are situations that disrupt systems, processes, and lifestyles. They adversely impact individuals, assets, prospects, operations, and reputations of organizations and societies on short and long-terms with significant environmental, social, economic, political, and legal consequences hence the need for priority attention to crises management. This study focused on crises in the oil and gas industry with special emphasis on the lingering situation in the Nigerian-Niger Delta between the communities, the oil and gas companies, and the Government. They became international concerns due to kidnappings, fatalities, assets destruction, environmental degradation, and poverty in the oil-rich region. Despite the industry's substantial expenditure on security, kidnapping and vandalism persist as restive youths who feel marginalized, seek to hurt systems they believe, denied them quality life. Despite general knowledge and blames traded by parties involved, the study used qualitative-historical-narrative-approach to interview representatives of communities, oil and gas companies, and Government to discover root causes of the crises. Coping theory by Lazarus and Folkman and crisis decision theory by Sweeny were utilized to understand the reasoning and responses of the people to the decisions and management strategies of the Government and oil and gas companies.

Abstract With the Oil and Gas drilling moving to deeper and deeper waters, offshore blow-out control and recovery methods imply bigger challenges. In this scenario of technology complexity and of ever increasing focus on safety and environmental issues, with the aim to minimize operative risks, a new dual ROV assisted well killing system for deepwater blow-out recovery was developed and patented. This system extends the range of actions to be used in case of a deepwater subsea blow-out during drilling operations. The system stands as a quick-response tool devoted to assist and enhance the probabilities of success of a vertical intervention from a Dynamic Positioning Rig on a deepwater well in blow-out, when the premises for such an intervention exist or could be created. The system is designed to use two ROVs to assist the re-entry of a killing string inside the flowing well to perform the vertical intervention. The system is also equipped with acoustic sensors for a full instrumental localization of the blow-out source in case of impaired visibility. When successful, this intervention minimizes hydrocarbons losses, environmental impact, operational costs and exposure to liability claims. The system and its sub-systems have been fully designed, developed and tested. System marinization has been addressed to, involving drilling rig operators and a third party certification body to review system interfaces, handling procedures and risk assessment for a safe use on board. This paper provides a description of the proposed intervention system, along with details on the achievements and lessons learnt in the development and testing phases. Introduction It is well recognized that one of the frontiers of the oil and gas industry is today the increasing water depth at which drilling and production take place. The technological challenges posed by ever increasing water depths require a steady improvement of drilling and production equipment and procedures, this being especially true for elements of major concern such as well control and response procedures to critical events. Oil spill disasters have tragically shown the dramatic effects that a sustained deepwater blow-out can have on personnel safety, the environment and company assets. Those accidents have ruled out any doubt on the necessity of evolving our technology to be able to cope with events which, as highly improbable they can be, eventually lead to catastrophic consequences. In this context, the Killing Guidance System (KGS) has been developed and patented, and stands as a quick response tool devoted to assist and enhance the success probabilities of a vertical intervention on a deepwater well in blow-out, when the premises for such an intervention exist (ref.3). To date, the main achievements have been: system manufacturing and integration, main functions dry-testing, main sub-systems performances assessment by shallow water testing, design validation by 1:8 scale model testing in naval basin and system marinization addressed by involving a major drillship operator and an independent certification body. The next project phase foresees to install the system onboard a selected Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) to perform a final interface test and a full field qualification.

Abstract Establishing an Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) map lays the foundation for a successful Emergency Response Plan. A safety company was tasked with the responsibility of ensuring the safety of residents living in a neighboring community where potentially hazardous drilling activity in a critical sour well with high H2S concentrations and potential high release rates was about to commence. The safety company was responsible for managing and monitoring the EPZ while constantly updating residents about progress on the drilling activity. An EPZ of 5.8 kilometers and an awareness zone of 11.6 kilometers were identified; the area of management contained one town and two hamlets of roughly 2000 inhabitants. To effectively monitor and ensure the safety of residents within the EPZ, the safety company dispatched and managed close to 100 onsite personnel. This large team was responsible for manning roadblocks, monitoring the various zones within the EZP, and maintaining buses on standby to evacuate low mobility groups. Another key element of this project was the successful handling of crucial public relations to defuse and manage potentially very tense situations. The sensitive nature of the issue required careful, consistent and regular communications as residents needed to be constantly updated on the impending drilling operations. To handle the daunting community relations issues effectively, the safety company deployed a number of ‘rovers’ to monitor and communicate with the public through house visits. A call centre was also set up for residents to reach out for more information. The project was so effectively managed that it even superseded the expectations of the regulatory body responsible for overseeing the drilling project. This paper will discuss in-depth details, learnings, insights and the various factors that were responsible for making this Emergency Response Planning project such a complete success.

Abstract A blowout is known to be the most severe event that can happen during explortation of petroleum resources. Oil-spill preparedness is important in general, particularly in the arctic region where uncertainties about consequences are high and contingency planning for major accidents requires extra attention. Calculation of blowout rates and durations from potential blowouts is an important part of environmental risk management, both in the planning phase of a well and during other well activities. BlowFlow is a software tool that has been developed for risk based evaluation of blowout scenarios in order to quantify blowout flow rates, volumes and durations. The results can be used as input to Environmental Risk Analysis, to dimension the emergency preparedness organization and identify both probability and consequence measures in the oil-spill preparedness planning. BlowFlow is meant as a cross-disciplinary tool for communication between petroleum, reservoir, drilling and HSE engineers. The basic design has been inspired by the guidelines given in [1]. Based on a fixed definition of potential blowout scenarios, BlowFlow provides probability distributions of potential blowout rates, durations and volumes for that can be used as input for the Environmental Risk Analysis. Since there are large uncertainties involved at the stage when such an analysis is performed, a stochastic modeling approach is used, i.e. Monte Carlo simulations and spline interpolations, based on multi-discipline expert input. Introduction Operators on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) are required by law to document the risk of petroleum activities as well as using this information for managing and reducing risk where applicable. Examples of risk analyses performed are Environmental Risk Analysis (ERA), Oil Spill Response Analysis (OSRA) and Total Risk Analysis (TRA), the latter for fields only. Today's practice in oil companies varies with respect to level of detail, assessment of uncertainty, nomenclature, documentation and traceability of the analysis. Due to the lack of relevant international and national standards, the Norwegian Oil and Gas Association has developed guidelines, c.f. for example [1], [2] or [3], based on a reference methodology in order to standardize nomenclature, procedure and documentation of blowout calculations. An ERA consists of a combination of probabilities for oil spill scenarios and corresponding blowout rates and durations, inducing a potential environmental damage. Oil drift models contribute to calculate damages of Valuable Ecological Components (VEC; for example fish and fish habitats) in the area of influence, and the time of restitution for the most vulnerable stock in the influence area is used to define the acceptance criteria for an activity. OSRA includes plans for consequence reducing measures and type and quantity of response resources needed. Efficient oil pollution response capability will reduce free oil on the surface, thereby reducing the total area of influence. Important inputs include geographical location, scenarios for oil spill and corresponding probabilities, type of operation, blowout rates and durations, oil type, wind and currents, time of year and VEC. In a Total Risk Analysis (TRA) and well killing context, potential gas release/blowout followed by loss of lives and structures are of interest. In the risk analyses previous mentioned, calculating realistic blowout rates and the duration of a blowout are important for the following analysis.

Abstract The Barzan Onshore Project is being developed by Barzan Gas Company Limited, a joint venture between Qatar Petroleum and ExxonMobil Barzan Limited, with RasGas assigned to develop and operate the facilities on completion. The Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) work is being carried out by JGC as the prime contractor. JGC has sub-contracted the construction execution of the work to eight major sub-contractors. The project has achieved over 90 Million Safe Man-hours since July 2012 when the one lost time incident project to date occurred. The workforce is approaching 29,000 persons from multiple countries. The paper describes the overall SHE&S Management System as a three-tier model based on the EPC contract in which there are 211 SHE&S contract-related deliverables (in eight general categories) measured monthly via the SHE&S Work Activities Schedule. The system pertains to all parties (RasGas, JGC, sub-contractors, vendors, suppliers, et al.) and this rigorous monthly accounting helps drive overall SHE&S performance. The contract combines a highly prescriptive as well as goal-setting approach, which to date has delivered a great foundation to build and sustain SHE&S performance at site. Within the paper, some of the key leading and lagging indicators are reviewed to demonstrate the correlation between the scope of work, stage of project execution, progress and key injury trends occurring at the site. The indicators are actively utilised on the project, especially the leading indicators to drive and sustain SHE&S performance. Six stellar areas and six challenging areas are also reviewed. The stellar areas demonstrate some of the key best practices that are implemented on the project and are producing strong results. The six challenging areas demonstrate some of the complex problems on the project and the methods that are used to improve these problem areas and help ensure that sufficient risk reduction measures and actions are being implemented. Overall SHE performance on the project continues to be strong although there are daily challenges. These challenges are overcome by a strong management commitment as well as a worker-focused programme that continually demonstrates care and concern for the project's most valuable asset, the workforce.