Overview There are a multitude of reasons why employers create safety and health-related documentation. These include compliance with mandatory paperwork requirements promulgated by the Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) and the Mine Safety & Health Administration (MSHA), which range from injury/illness records, to documentation of training provided to workers (both formal courses and less formal "toolbox talks"), as well as workplace examinations, equipment inspections, industrial hygiene monitoring, and exposure control plans to guard against health hazards associated with asbestos, lead, silica, and other toxic chemicals. There is another universe of documents, which are routinely created and maintained in the course of business voluntarily or as a matter of "best practice." These include: employee handbooks, safety and health audits, safety and health programs, incentive and disciplinary programs, safety and health committee minutes, job hazard analysis (JHA) or other standard operating procedures, job descriptions, safety and health management systems, environmental compliance handbooks, occupational health programs, medical surveillance programs, and internal training materials. Properly prepared and maintained, these documents can be your best line of defense (a shield) against unwarranted citations or other enforcement actions. But failure to invoke legal privilege where available, carelessly written documents, or materials that contain information constituting an admission against interest by the employer or its agents of management, can be used as a sword against you by OSHA and MSHA. Even documents viewed as proactive, or helpful, by an employer can be used to show "employer recognition" of hazardous conditions, which can support enforcement actions under OSHA's General Duty Clause, or to heighten the level of negligence assigned to a citation by showing a pattern or practice of recurring safety and health problems. Documents that can inadvertently be produced voluntarily and then used as the government's "Exhibit A" against the employer include safety and health audits, safety and health committee meeting minutes, near-miss reports, and job hazard analysis forms. Moreover, improper destruction of documents, particularly those where a litigation "hold" has been placed under notice by OSHA or MSHA, can even give rise to criminal prosecution for obstruction of justice or conspiracy!

Introduction Most occupational safety and health (OSH) professionals would agree that there is an evolution underway in how we practice. Going back ten years or so, the predominance of thought leaders postulating that our compliance-based approach to developing workplace safety programs had run out of steam, so to speak, grew. This thinking was based upon a review of statistical data that showed a slowing in the reduction of fatalities and, in some cases, an increase in the number of serious injuries; those which result in permanent disability or lengthy periods of time off work. It also was not unusual for large organizations with deep pockets for OSH resources to end up with low or nonexistent incident rates of less serious injuries, but still experience multiple fatalities or catastrophic events in the same time frame. These awakenings resulted in an introspective review of the of the basic tenets upon which most OSH programs were based, and many OSH professionals concluded that the profession has been mistaken in believing that focusing efforts on the reducing in frequency of minor incidents would lead to a simultaneous reduction in the severity of them. It is important to note that movement away from a reliance on compliance-based approaches does not mean ignoring the requirements of applicable laws and regulations. In fact, all OHSMS mention the need to comply. As noted below, OSH policies must mention compliance as a primary expectation. However, compliance is not intended to be the only focus nor is it intended to be the type of focus that obscures the systemic foundation needed for achieving continuous improvement.

Introduction In the cumulative experience of author is that, to date, the majority of U.S. employers still struggle to maintain a consistently effective lockout/tagout protocol with their workers, contractors, and vendors. Driven by the limited guidance provided by regulatory requirements only, compliance is very difficult to routinely achieve. The latest version of the ANSI/ASSE Control of Hazardous Energy Lockout, Tagout and Alternative Methods standard, released in December 2016, is a well-resourced and progressive look at how to include well-described energy control practices into daily productive operations. This appeals to employers who seek to understand how to improve their energy-related protective practices and resonates with people whose work exposes them to the hazards of sudden machine startup. The newly revised Z244 standard speaks to these needs by offering comprehensive information on the latest methodology and how to accomplish across all industries, and especially in your workplace. How the New ANSI Z244 Standard influences the Practice of Lockout/Tagout and Alternative Methods Certainly, the methods of protecting workers against the sudden startup of machinery have evolved greatly over the years. The most often referenced source of lockout/tagout information is OSHA's 29 CFR1910.147 regulation, which came out in 1989. It was based heavily on ANSI's original Z244.1 Lockout Standard first published in 1982. We have come a long way since then in terms of technology and new methods, but there certainly is a long way to go. Each year OSHA publishes its Top 10 Most Cited Violations and again, for Fiscal 2016, lockout was ranked fifth (with very similar outcomes as 2015) in terms of the particular rules that were cited and value of the citations issued. Heightened self-reporting requirements for serious injuries and fatalities are bringing more violations to OSHA's attention, and it seems that many U.S. employers are coming to an understanding that these types of accidents continue to occur with significant frequency and often with great severity.

Introduction URS | CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) combines the talents of two global engineering, design, construction, project management and environmental services companies, AECOM and CH2M, and small business partner Restoration Services, Inc. (RSI). With AECOM as lead partner, UCOR manages the cleanup of 2,200-acre East Tennessee Technology Park for its client and partner, the U.S. Department of Energy, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The site was contaminated with radioactive, hazardous and industrial wastes generated by more than 40 years of national defense and energy missions. The East Tennessee Technology Park, once called the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, was built as part of the super-secret Manhattan Project in the 1940s to enrich uranium for the atomic bombs that would end World War II. The site later produced enriched uranium for commercial and defense purposes. Operations ceased in 1985, and the site was permanently shut down in 1987. That same year, the Oak Ridge Reservation was placed on the National Priorities List as a Superfund site, designating it to be cleaned up under the provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). The Department of Energy (DOE) then began cleanup operations, which include demolition of many of the buildings at the site. This massive, multi-decade cleanup mission is executed through close partnerships among the DOE, UCOR, community stakeholders, and the represented workforce. These partnerships work to advance environmental cleanup, enable new and enduring missions, and support the shared vision to reindustrialize the East Tennessee Technology Park, turning it into a vibrant private-sector industrial park.

Introduction CPWR – The Center for Construction Research and Training is a nonprofit organization that currently serves as the National Construction Center for the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). In cooperation with key federal and construction industry partners nationwide, CPWR's mission is to reduce occupational injuries, illnesses, and fatalities in the construction industry through research, training, and service programs. CPWR's research objective is to: Identify current and emerging hazards facing construction workers on the jobsite and conduct research to understand the safety and health implications of those hazards. Develop evidence-informed technologies and protective measures to prevent occupational injuries and illnesses. Publicize research findings and also translate them into practical tools and resources the industry can use to protect workers, also called Research to Practice (r2p). To facilitate this last objective, researchers at CPWR, in close collaboration with academics and industry stakeholders, develop r2p resources including, but not limited to, informational guides and brochures, hazard-specific websites and online resources, toolkits, training programs, toolbox talks, and hazard alert cards. This paper will: Introduce some of our r2p resources currently available to stakeholders to advance safety and health in the construction industry. Describe the Construction Solutions Program, and how to navigate the solutions website. Describe our current r2p efforts to aid the industry in improving construction jobsite safety climate.

Introduction Not all high-consequence events make the news and capture national attention, like the Deepwater Horizon explosion or the release of methyl isocyanate in Bhopal, but by definition they cause serious, life-altering damage, injuries and deaths, affecting not only the persons involved, but their families, friends and coworkers, and in severe cases, the local community. At the very least, businesses are likely to suffer damage to their reputations, and the consequences may be much worse. According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 40 percent of businesses do not reopen after a disaster, and another 25 percent fail within one year of reopening. A large number of these events had an extremely low probability of occurring, and yet they did. Nicolas Taleb refers to these types of occurrences as "black swan" events, and describes them as outliers, with extreme impact, and retrospective (though not prospective) predictability. Current approaches to risk assessment are based on a determination of the probability and severity of incident outcomes. In addition to evaluating normal operating conditions, more sophisticated risk assessments often also evaluate the outcome of interruptions to normal operations (upset conditions). However, simple probability and severity analysis may not be adequate in evaluating low probability, high-consequence events. Accident Causation Theories In order to start understanding low-probability/high-consequence events, we want to look first at theories of how accidents are caused. One of the earliest theories is the Domino Theory, developed by H.W. Heinrich in 1932. As depicted below, it posits that accidents occur when the linkage for a chain reaction lines up like dominoes on end. Each of the factors in the chain is dependent on the preceding factor.

Introduction Over the last several years, organizations across the world have made great strides in safety performance. Technological advancements, holistic safety systems, and better understanding of the elements of exposure reduction have all contributed to a safer work environment. Even with all the progress, people continue to get hurt, and rates for the most serious injuries have yet to decline at the same pace as other injury types. Some organizations are taking a proactive approach to addressing hazards. For many, their performance is good, sometimes very good. But they know to become great, they must take safety to the next level. It is not enough to establish rules and procedures around safe performance. Even when employees follow them to the letter, there are situations that can't be covered in advance, leaving individuals exposed to hazards that can arise unexpectedly. This paper outlines a mechanism for developing a robust hazard recognition ability into the organization's toolkit. The process uses real-life, exposure-based scenarios to assist supervisors and their teams in recognizing when exposure is changing and enhancing their response to it as it arises. The process builds upon practical exposure-reduction practices to enhance teamwork and communications. Learning Through Scenarios There is a wealth of educational and organizational research that shows learning through scenarios or stories can have a profound and long-term impact on people. This is especially true when the learning is centered on things that are significant to learners and administered by people that have the most experience with the work. Enhancing hazard recognition and response using exposure-based scenarios allows supervisors and workers to train in risk mitigation practices that directly address the hazards they face every day.

The issue of combustible dust and its associated hazards (i.e., fire, deflagration and explosion) has existed for hundreds of years, throughout numerous industries in the United States and abroad. When combustible dust fires and explosions occur, they tend to be catastrophic. However, due to their complexity, combustible dust hazards are frequently overlooked and incorrectly perceived as low priority and low risk. After several high-profile accidents and fatalities, as well as increased enforcement by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and other Authorities Having Jurisdiction (AHJs) (e.g., fire marshals/departments, insurance firms/carriers, etc.), each facility has been forced to reexamine their perception of the combustible dust hazards. As can be observed from so many of the investigation findings of previous combustible dust incidents, employers and employees appear to be unaware of the hazards posed by combustible particulate solids that have the potential to form combustible dusts when processed, stored or handled. Thus, the Dust Hazards Analysis (DHA) was recently created to identify and combat the potential hazards associated with combustible dusts and combustible particulate solids. Although all the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) combustible dust standards now retroactively require a DHA to be performed, the importance of a DHA goes far beyond just a requirement. When performed correctly, a DHA not only thoroughly identifies and assesses complex combustible dust hazards, but also provides specific techniques to mitigate these hazards. Unfortunately, all DHAs are not created equal, and all too often, DHAs misidentify or ignore potentially serious fire and explosion hazards (especially DHAs performed by unqualified individuals or entities).

The PDF file is a slide presentation. Overview Definitions Hazard Identification and Control Accidents Work Planning Workplace Hazards System Safety Hazards and Risk Hazard: a dangerous condition, either potential or inherent, which can interfere with the expected, orderly progress of a given activity Risk: a measured or calculated chance of exposure to hazard(s) which may or may not result in loss Both should be managed! Accidents and Incidents Accident: an unplanned and therefore unwanted or undesired event resulting in physical harm and/or property damage Incident: an unplanned event that did not but could have resulted in physical harm and/or property damage Both should be investigated!

Introduction Concern for worker safety and working conditions in the Middle East, and especially Qatar, is currently on the world stage (Cronin, 2017). This paper aims to present and discuss many of the challenges to achieving world class safety in this area, as well as the root causes and the successes and improvements that have been achieved. The solutions are not straight forward though. The barriers to achieving world class safety in the Middle East are deeply rooted in culture and are extremely complex. Working for the past six years in a safety leadership role, as well as being a female, I have been able to provide a unique approach and view to the situation in the Middle East and identify opportunities to overcome many cultural barriers to an injury free workplace. This paper presents information and first-hand experience I have gained working in the construction industry in the Middle East for the past six years, as well as much study and research into the complex cultural roots. As you read, it is important to remember that "culture" is not simply nationality or religion. The "culture" within the workforce and on our projects is a result of knowledge, experiences, values, attitudes, perceptions, social habits, etc.; as well as many years of conflict between countries and people. Current Economical Drivers in Middle East Before addressing the safety challenges, it's important to understand what is driving the rise in development and subsequent construction in the Middle East. The Gulf Region - or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) - of the Middle East consists of Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (GCC n.d.). These are the areas surrounding the Arabian Gulf (Exhibit 1). These countries have undergone rapid economic, demographic and social changes in the past twenty years - mainly due to their oil and gas exports.

Introduction A comprehensive and effective Lockout Tagout program is paramount for safety within any workplace where employees can be exposed to hazardous energy. The equipment and workforce within each facility is unique, therefore, lockout tagout programs and their implementation can vary significantly between companies. Unfortunately, many businesses often fail to implement an adequate lockout tagout program within their facility, or in the worst case, don't practice the use of lockout tagout at all. This is highlighted by the fact that lockout tagout continues to be a top 10 OSHA violation each year. In FY2014, lockout tagout was the 6th most cited OSHA standard. Every year, thousands of injuries and hundreds of deaths are attributable to the unexpected release of hazardous energy, and these accidents could have been avoided with the proper utilization of lockout tagout products and procedures. Kina Repp, a nationally recognized motivational and safety speaker, stands as proof that a failure to enforce lock out/ tag out procedures can have a devastating impact. As a young college student, I was employed at an Alaskan cannery and tasked with cleaning conveyor belts. My first day on the job, I was assigned to clean a large conveyor without safety training, or the supervision of individuals properly trained to operate the equipment, and with no lock out/tag out procedures in place. What followed was a horrifying chain of events that forced me to fight for survival and changed my life and that of my family. Today, I dedicate myself to sharing the details of that lifeshattering experience in hope of preventing injuries and personal devastation for others. My presentation emphasizes why it is critical to: Have and strictly enforce lock out/tag out procedures; Ensure all personnel associated with energy sources are well-trained in and follow control procedures; Look for and be prepared to mitigate hidden hazards; To ensure individuals protect the well-being of their co-workers; and Ensure new employees understand and follow all safety processes and rules. My story is an emotional reminder as well about the ripple effect an incident can have others. This paper outlines the key requirements of OSHA's 1910.147 Control of Hazardous Energy standard and offers best practice recommendations for developing an effective energy control program.

Introduction While it is easy to understand why an organization would want to improve safety performance, it is much more challenging to prescribe how an improvement will be achieved. Traditionally, organizations have measured the success of their safety improvement efforts by how well they avoid and prevent employees from getting injured, as evident in the various accident-based metrics used to measure and compare and contrast "safe" organizations from "un-safe" ones. Success or failure often hinges upon the absence of adverse events. Efforts to improve safety are typically based on improving some accident-based metric, and often with little consideration as to how these goals will be achieved. Narrowly focusing on improving accident-based metrics may result in some marginal safety improvement, but more likely will lead to the active concealment and underreporting of hazards and employee injuries (United States Dept. of Justice, 2013). Accident-based metrics are poor indicators of safety performance and just do not provide the insight necessary for organizational leadership to make informed decisions regarding safety and risk. A more effective approach to achieving sustainable safety improvements is needed. Through the process of incorporating formal goal-setting mechanisms into existing management processes, management can move beyond simple reductions in accident-based metrics and shift toward the implementation and integration of management processes and systems that bring about a greater clarity and focus to an organization's safety management and improvement efforts. The Issue with Accident-based Metrics As early as 1996, influential safety pioneer Dan Petersen wrote how measuring performance through accident based metrics was a " waste of time" and " meaninglessness." (Petersen, 1996, pp. 15–33; Petersen, 2001) Petersen went on to advocate that organizations should use "anything but accident based metrics" to measure the performance of management, and instead focus on the active participation in activities designed to improve safety performance. Let me be clear; results matter! Preventing injuries and accidents matter! Demonstrating measurable improvement in our ability to prevent accident and injuries, through recognizing and reducing risk, matter! Organizations should never abandon their "zero-injury" mindset, yet be mindful that having a "zero-injury" mindset is not a sustainable safety improvement strategy.

Introduction The many thousands of workplaces subject to Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulation are faced with a variety of challenging safety issues over the course of completing a project or operating a facility. Under OSHA standards, all workplaces are required to develop emergency response plans in order to effectively respond to the many and varied safety crises that businesses face in the modern economy. Considerable effort is expended every year by safety and legal professionals to create and further develop quality emergency response plans. Unfortunately, no matter how much time and money is expended to prevent crises, they occur, and can have devastating consequences. When a crisis does occur, the affected company must implement their emergency response plan and investigate the accident or incident. Taking the time and effort to construct a thorough emergency response plan is invaluable when a real-world crisis scenario occurs. However, even the most elegant emergency response plan requires dedicated effort to implement correctly. The purpose of this paper is to provide a proactive and cautious approach to investigating accidents and incidents, with particular attention paid to securing and documenting the scene of the accident, communications and the attorney-client privilege, interviews and statements of third parties, documenting the crisis, providing assistance to the families of those affected by the crisis, and producing quality and useful internal investigation report. Securing and Documenting the Scene After taking emergency response measures designed to protect the lives of those involved in the crisis incident, the first priority for an employer should be to secure and document the scene of the incident. Securing the site is of vital importance, as it is incumbent upon employers to preserve material evidence that will be necessary to complete a root-cause investigation. Access to the site of the incident should be heavily restricted, and limited only to potential law enforcement, OSHA compliance officers, and the employer's investigative personnel. Preventing access to the site may be accomplished through the use of barriers, such as caution tape or cones identifying the restricted area.

Introduction In order to consider occupational safety in the context of systems, one must first have some understanding of what a system is and how systems operate, interconnect, and adapt in light of systems of interest within an operating environment. While an in-depth analysis of systems would take several of these papers, Professor Derek Hitchins sums up systems as follows: Essentially, the [systems] approach considered a system-of-interest (SOI) to be open, dynamic, to exist in an environment, to interact with — and adapt to — other systems in that environment, and to form part of a larger, wider system. The systems could be of any kind, but are generally characterized as functional, i.e., the systems, subsystems, containing systems, etc., all perform functions and exhibit behavior (D. Hitchins, 2016). In our application to Occupational Safety, this basic definition fits perfectly. The system is the organizational function and the systems of interests (SOI) are the specific operations of those organizational functions. For example, production would be a system, but breaking down production further would uncover SOIs, subsystems, and containing systems that are interconnected and must adapt to the overall system. Such systems could include purchasing, supply chain, human resources, accounting, and of course safety. However, in the organizational structure we know these SOIs are often free standing systems on their own with their own sets of SOIs and subsystems. Think of this in terms of interacting systems and SOIs contained within an operational environment. The Problem We see that many in the safety profession battle to find their place within this operational environment. We regularly hear safety professionals lamenting operational focus at the "expense of safety"; so they assert their authority from the periphery, often controversially, sometimes disruptively. One of our earliest memories of ASSE as new members was a first chapter meeting. Sitting silently, we listened to a group of five "seasoned" safety professional discussing the various processes they "shut down" that past week in response to management's "lack of regard for safety".

Abstract Considerable reductions in process safety incidents have not been realized over the past 40 years despite the extensive developments in technology. Root causes for these incidents remain the same but the likelihood and severity of consequences have been slightly reduced. The debate continues - Why do we continue to experience similar incidents even with establishment of new tools, technologies, management systems and lessons learned? Is it the lack of process safety competency, corporate culture, or complexity of current management systems and associated tools contributing to the continuation of the learning failures? This paper will review the mutual causes of learning failures from past major process safety incidents and examine what has not changed over several decades. Improvement opportunities are provided for the most common learning gaps. Introduction Learning from incidents is not limited to just incident investigation, but much beyond that, learning from incidents is also ingrained into corporate policies, engineering and design standards, and operating management systems. So, it is important to identify and eliminate the gaps in these processes and systems to prevent the recurrences of major accidents. With enormous overall technological developments in the last several decades, processes, tools and management systems are getting more complex leading to inconsistency in operating management systems and hamper the effective implementing. The design, construction, and operation bring several opportunities for errors and mistakes during the life cycle of a project. That's why every project, when handed over to operations, has a long list of design and installation deficiencies. During the initial startup, operating set points are changed and a number of safety systems and alarms are bypassed. Some of these bypassed critical systems are never restored due to a lack of effective management programs. Consistent gaps are discovered in the operating management systems and process safety knowledge of the workforce. The most common causes of learning failures and improvement opportunities are clarified in order for each of the identified gaps to advance the learning process and prevent the recurrences of process safety incidents.

Introduction To remain competitive, manufacturers are challenged to be nimble with necessary technology changes, including fast integration of new equipment and processes brought into manufacturing sites on a regular basis. As a result, site management must implement efficient and sustainable change management business processes that continually evaluate, update, and periodically reassess to ensure the safe operations and maintenance of the equipment and facilities. A strong job hazard analysis (JHA) process integrates well, and creates environmental, health, and safety (EHS) value, with necessary business change-management processes in modern manufacturing and research and development (R&D) sites. JHAs are often used towards compliance to Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) workplace hazard assessment requirements (Title 29 CFR 1910.132(d)(2). However, as EHS professionals are keenly aware, this can also result in mediocre EHS assessments at best when JHAs are conducted as stand-alone compliance tools, and those which are quickly out of date. JHAs run the risk of being viewed as only a compliance tool, and typically subject to becoming just another passing EHS phase. This paper is based on a confidential JHA project conducted at a global, process-intensive manufacturing site. This manufacturing site as well as other sites within the company use JHAs as a standard business process to meet regulatory compliance requirements and drive risk reduction. Due to the rapid pace of new process and equipment introductions supporting manufacturing and R&D equipment, the JHAs were quickly becoming obsolete, and a formal process for updating the assessments was not in place. A management decision was made to implement a robust management process to ensure that JHAs not only met regulatory requirements, but also remained current to match the pace of business change.

Abstract This paper presents findings and lessons learned from the U.S. Chemical Safety Board's investigation of the 2013 Williams Olefins Plant reboiler rupture and fire. The investigation found that serious deficiencies in the site's process safety management program, including Management of Change, Pre-Startup Safety Review, and Process Hazard Analysis, were causal to the incident. This article presents lessons learned from the incident that apply broadly to the chemical process industry. Introduction In June 2013, a reboiler that was isolated from its pressure relief valve catastrophically ruptured when heat was applied to it during an operations activity. Two operations personnel were killed. An investigation into the incident found that a series of process safety management program deficiencies over the 12 years leading to the incident caused the reboiler to be unprotected from overpressure. Weaknesses in the site's Management of Change (MOC), Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR), and Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) programs contributed to the incident. This article discusses lessons learned from the 2013 reboiler overpressure incident at the Williams Geismar Olefins Plant, which was investigated by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board. Incident Background The propylene fractionator (a distillation column) in the Williams Geismar Olefins Plant originally operated with two reboilers (Reboiler A and Reboiler B). In 2001, the site installed block valves on the shell (process) side and tube (hot water) side to allow for operation of only one reboiler at a time, with the other reboiler on standby. The tube side of the reboilers periodically fouled and required cleaning, and installing the valves allowed for single reboiler operation and continuous operation of the distillation column when the reboilers required cleaning. The pressure relief valve for both reboilers was located on top of the distillation column. The block valves installed in 2001 could isolate the reboilers from their pressure relief valve, introducing an overpressure hazard to the reboilers ( Exhibit 1 ). At the time of block valve installation, the site did not identify the reboiler overpressure hazard. In the subsequent 12 years leading to the incident, overpressure protection was not effectively applied to the reboilers.

Introduction Frequency rates of severe injury, including fatality, as well as occupational diseases, are notably higher in construction than other industries. Studies also indicate that the safety performance of the construction industry is always under challenge due to various factors, including the inherent nature of high-risk activities, deployment of large number of unskilled people, and use of heavy machinery, as well as various demographic factors. Construction workers keep moving from one place to the other to pursue their profession. Prior to joining the trade, a miniscule number of them receive some formal skill training and safety training, which are essential for safe working. Consequently, a large portion of them get set to pick up the trade skills on-the-job, which compounds the challenges of ensuring safe working at site. In this study, spanning 18 months' duration, involving over 20,000 workers from multiple project sites, factors associated with "risk perception," emerge as one of the most common causative contributors for various recordable injury cases. The study highlights that misplaced risk perception by the individuals associated with the activities at various levels have acted as the "trigger," directly or indirectly, leading the event chain to injury outcome. Subsequently, focused efforts are planned for mitigation by improving risk awareness among all concerned team members through various methods, including on-the-job, classroom training, and experiential learning associated with activity-related hazards and consequences. This paper will describe facets of risk perception, and its role in risk mitigation, and demonstrate the effectiveness of awareness programs, as well as other initiatives in optimizing risk perception for incident prevention. Risk can be quantified and is a product of probability and consequence of the event. Any activity beyond an acceptable risk level needs to be treated with suitable mitigation measures to bring the risk to within as low as reasonably practicable limits.

Introduction With a combined experience of approximately 30 years the authors have worked in 10 different industries where the challenge of lone worker safety has existed. In the course of their careers they have helped companies in the identification of lone workers and how to control the hazards presented. In their current role, they consult with a variety of industries, including manufacturing, municipalities, energy, and construction, on various safety topics including the management of lone workers. Through their work experience the authors have identified the need for adapting hazard identification, traditional safety definitions and programs relating to lone workers to our ever-changing world. The traditional definition of a "lone worker" is changing as a direct result of our changing world and culture. The traditional definition identifies a situation in which personnel work with hazardous materials or in a position with a high degree of risk, otherwise known as a safety-sensitive position. The traditional definition takes into account personnel with high risk; high exposure while the new definition along with an effective hazard assessment will show how low risk personnel can now have high implications on a company. This paper will cover how companies may want to change the definition of a lone worker, the steps to conduct a hazard assessment to quantify the level of exposure in their workplace, and ways to control the risk exposure through safety policies and procedures or emergency management plans. Whether a seasoned safety and health professional, executive or top management, or someone just assigned to safety in their organization, this paper will present various tools for the reader to take back to their workplace.

Introduction The opportunity to achieve top quartile performance in health and human safety requires new and innovative approaches. We must leverage predictable analysis and evaluation methods combined with innovative blended solutions to enhance the safety in the workplace and workforce. Isolating key behaviors was a critical success factor for the Safety Connection initiative. Health and safety professionals are conditioned to use training as a primary tool to advance objectives in achieving safety excellence. With limited time and resources, it is imperative to analyze the systematic causal factors that may be entrenched in the workplace and the workforce. Assuming that only a training solution will produce the desired outcome is a risky decision and could derail or impede the desired state. This paper describes a process to analyze, design and measure the impact of blended solutions, cultural indicators and leading safety indicators. We devised and applied the following principles, methods and tools throughout the initiative: Applied a holistic approach for achieving safety goals Leverage rapid tools to identify desired goal Utilized a bar napkin exercise to discuss solutions and perceptions with stakeholders Created an Impact Map that aligns key safety behaviors to measurable results Apply the Success Case evaluation methodology to quickly measure the pilots effectiveness Utilizing this approach required experts within our company who are skilled in Human Performance Technology and who can effectively partner with leaders and experts in safety to discern key barriers that potentially impede success by uncovering answers to the following questions: How is your safety strategy perceived within your company? What is the desired state for your safety initiative? Who else knows this and cares? Are your safety indicators really leading or lagging? What are the critical safety behaviors for your workforce and management? How do you currently measure those key behaviors? What internal and external motivators exist to support the goal? What consequences are in place for supervisors or managers who exhibit poor safety?