OSH professionals have a major role in communicating risks to employers and employees at all levels. They need to be technically competent, but that isn't enough; they also need to be good listeners and communicators. Health and safety can be regarded as complex, and it is the job of the OSH practitioners to simplify the messages and make them relevant to the people they advise, using language that will fit into the business culture. Messages need to be tailored to different audiences. For example, migrant workers may not speak the language of the country fluently and, therefore, may have difficulty in understanding instructions, asserting their rights at work, and seeking help. As a result, they are less likely to report accidents. They may be unable to communicate effectively with other employees, and their understanding of risk may be impaired. In these cases, different ways of communicating need to be found to get the message understood. On the other hand, senior managers or human resource professionals need to be able to hear the business case for health and safety to persuade them to invest both financially and emotionally in health and safety. Workers need to understand how they can integrate safety into their tasks so that any risks are ‘acceptable’. Building trust and credibility is key to successful communication and forming functional alliances helps with this process (Joyce, Hand 2012). This paper discusses: Why the OSH practitioner needs to get heard What the OSH practitioner needs to communicate regarding acceptable risk and control Who the OSH practitioner needs to communicate with How to choose the best communication channel The need for planning a communication strategy How to get the message across; the skills needed for good communication. Communication case studies from a public sector utility in the UK and a construction contractor are outlined. Participants will gain an understanding of the seven Cs of effective communication to appreciate the need to make functional alliances and learn about practical examples of how communication has been improved in companies.

Introduction Companies increasingly view the accumulated skills and intellectual capital of their workforce as a major resource and, in many cases, as a competitive advantage. If you ask a group of CEOs what their business's biggest asset is, one of the most common answers you'll hear is "It's our people that make this company a world leader in our field." To safeguard that leadership position, companies make every effort to ensure their employees are kept satisfied, healthy and safe at work because their ability to succeed in the marketplace is heavily reliant on the continued health and job satisfaction of their workforce. To keep employees happy and satisfied companies offer competitive wages and benefits. To help keep them healthy, employers offer world-class health insurance and additional paid programs like smoking cessation programs or subsidized gym memberships to help employees maintain a healthy lifestyle. But what role does traditional workplace safety management play in protecting workers from unintentional injury and death, and how is that role changing in the modern world? Many safety systems aren't particularly efficient at protecting workers. Most corporate safety programs focus exclusively on workplace safety, which means that for the eight hours a day someone is at work they have the benefit of a safety manager, PPE and other safety measures. Unfortunately, the vast majority of injuries and accidental deaths occur outside the workplace, and a key issue that many employers face today is how to use their current safety management system to protect employees 24/7. This paper will demonstrate that businesses will increase productivity and reduce costs by including off-the-job safety in their safety program. It will also outline how corporate leaders can take proactive measures to protect their workers at work, at home and on the road.

Introduction Much of the effort to build and maintain a robust safety management system is focused on written documents which outline for employees the step-by-step, rule-by-rule expectations of how they should behave. These include procedures, training, job hazard analysis, and many other forms of instruction. Why is it, then, that even companies with very mature safety management systems in place still continue to experience unwanted events and injuries? Why do the best safety improvement strategies and initiatives sometimes meet resistance and failure? The answer is that often times we fail to recognize and account for the underlying organizational culture. It is the culture that causes organizations to accept or reject change. It is the culture that influences employees' interpretations of the meaning of instructions and select behaviors they think meet the intent and are appropriate or acceptable in that environment. Managing organizational culture requires constant and consistent reinforcement. The frontline supervisor is ideally positioned to greatly influence the culture. They set expectations, demonstrate behaviors and values, and reinforce employee behaviors and attitudes. However, many supervisors lack an understanding of this important responsibility. Supervisors often become so focused on ensuring the work is getting done, they fail to provide the leadership necessary to nurture a strong, positive culture. In this paper, the author will review sources of information for the definition of safety culture and share thoughts on the development and implementation of a safety culture management strategy, including the importance of training and engaging front-line leadership. It will also explore the use of situational learning to create dynamic learning opportunities and a model the author has used to develop and engage front-line leaders. Defining Your Safety Culture Elements of Safety Culture It seems we often hear the term "safety culture" used, but rarely with any clarity as to the real meaning. We use it positively to indicate a low number of unexpected events or a high awareness of safety in the workplace. We use it negatively as a vague causal factor in injuries and unexpected events. It is the author's experience that the use of the term "safety culture" is rarely paired with an understanding of the desired traits or principles which make up the safety culture and contribute to the positive or negative perceptions and outcomes.

Introduction The author was introduced to occupational fatalities and serious injuries (FSIs) in the mid 90's while working as a safety professional in the elevator/escalator industry. During that era fatalities and serious injuries were common in the industry. Despite experiencing 8–10 fatalities per year, our company was respected for having one of the best safety records in the business. We maintained a very robust safety management system and design/implementation standards which were created through industry standards, best practices and lessons learned from our FSI events. Recognizing that our safety approach, albeit successful at reducing OSHA Recordables, wasn't designed to effectively predict and prevent fatalities, we needed some way of focusing on operational risks with the potential to kill or seriously injure our employees - a field FSI risk reality check. To fulfil this need we developed a Fatality Prevention Audit (FPA) process. Our FPA was a globally deployed assessment of actual field operations to known FSI hazards and our required controls. It resulted in an excellent reality check of field processes, behaviors, conditions and precursors of FSI events which ultimately led to a significant reduction in FSIs. Since those days I have developed and deployed numerous FPA programs for a wide variety of industries such and manufacturing, mining and steelmaking. Even in such a wide variety of operations, the process of designing and deploying an effective FPA process is largely the same. This paper focuses on the key elements essential to the initial development and implementation of an effective FPA process - independent of your industry or operational environment. Why Do You Need An FPA? Is your organization surprised when you have a serious or fatal accident, because you never saw it coming? Even if your organization has never experienced a fatality, asking "Why do we need a Fatality Prevention Audit" is a fair and very appropriate question. If your organization doesn't fully understand and recognize the value of this process, it will become more of an organizational burden than a value. And, if not deployed properly, it will offer a false sense of FSI risk security to management.

Introduction While it is easy to understand why an organization would want to improve safety performance, it is much more challenging to prescribe how an improvement will be achieved. Traditionally, organizations have measured the success of their safety improvement efforts by how well they avoid and prevent employees from getting injured, as evident in the various accident-based metrics used to measure and compare and contrast "safe" organizations from "un-safe" ones. Success or failure often hinges upon the absence of adverse events. Efforts to improve safety are typically based on improving some accident-based metric, and often with little consideration as to how these goals will be achieved. Narrowly focusing on improving accident-based metrics may result in some marginal safety improvement, but more likely will lead to the active concealment and underreporting of hazards and employee injuries (United States Dept. of Justice, 2013). Accident-based metrics are poor indicators of safety performance and just do not provide the insight necessary for organizational leadership to make informed decisions regarding safety and risk. A more effective approach to achieving sustainable safety improvements is needed. Through the process of incorporating formal goal-setting mechanisms into existing management processes, management can move beyond simple reductions in accident-based metrics and shift toward the implementation and integration of management processes and systems that bring about a greater clarity and focus to an organization's safety management and improvement efforts. The Issue with Accident-based Metrics As early as 1996, influential safety pioneer Dan Petersen wrote how measuring performance through accident based metrics was a " waste of time" and " meaninglessness." (Petersen, 1996, pp. 15–33; Petersen, 2001) Petersen went on to advocate that organizations should use "anything but accident based metrics" to measure the performance of management, and instead focus on the active participation in activities designed to improve safety performance. Let me be clear; results matter! Preventing injuries and accidents matter! Demonstrating measurable improvement in our ability to prevent accident and injuries, through recognizing and reducing risk, matter! Organizations should never abandon their "zero-injury" mindset, yet be mindful that having a "zero-injury" mindset is not a sustainable safety improvement strategy.

Introduction Take a moment to imagine the following; you are a safety manager responsible for multiple worksites along the West Coast of the United States, ranging from Southern California to the Pacific Northwest. These worksites, known as marine terminals, vary in size, ranging from fifty to four hundred acres. The stevedoring industry, at times, has been defined as high-hazard with a heavy man/machine interface. This is a twenty-four-hour operation composed of three working shifts. As the sun breaks the Eastern horizon, today is just like every other day on a marine terminal; you have no idea who's coming to work to move cargo; IWLU membership will fill the jobs. However, who precisely will be determined as that shifts' workforce arrives through the terminal turnstiles. Welcome to the world of stevedoring and marine terminal operations. This document provides a brief overview of West Coast containerized cargo operations and the unique safety challenges presented with a transient workforce. I will share my prior experience in the role as a West Coast safety manager and the solutions generated by reducing not only the traditional incident frequency rate, but also, the quantity of severe injuries sustained within the workplace. The most meaningful solution developed was a visual three-dimensional model relating two traditionally non-relatable spheres of safety: regulatory requirements and critical safety " to-do's" with the concept of workplace culture. The design is meaningful as all individuals within the work environment can visualize the components required of an effective safety management system. To see is to understand, and with understanding comes forward momentum. This presentation will examine the fundamental building blocks of the model, the structure they support, and the resulting culture. Exploration of the model, in its current state, can be applied to most work environments. I will share a few particular " wins" impacting both the company's resulting culture as well as the industry.

Introduction As a safety professional, I work with a wide variety of organizations and often serve as a coach and mentor to new safety coordinators and managers. These include those who have recently chosen safety as a vocation or have been promoted from within an organization. Many have taken on the role as safety manager in addition to their day-to-day responsibilities. These may include, for example, human resources professionals, office managers, or project superintendents. As a new coordinator or manager, it can be challenging to know exactly where to start, not only to learn about safety in general, but how to build a basic program. For example, one may have to locate or piece together program materials from a former manager. Furthermore, there may be no safety program at all. In addition, new managers may not be thoroughly familiar with the processes involved at their organization, let alone the safety regulations that apply. The goal of the following discussion will be to emphasize how new safety managers do not have to build everything from the ground up. Instead, they can take advantage of existing and easily available resources, and take practical steps toward developing and implementing an effective safety program. While this discussion is geared for new managers, more experienced safety professionals can also benefit from the concepts of planning for safety, hazard identification and control, training, communication, and ensuring the effectiveness of their safety activities. These topics or "buckets" frame basic safety considerations for the new safety manager. By becoming a sound practitioner in each, the safety manager will be setting the stage for program success, as well as their future development and capabilities. Bucket One: Plan for Safety The first "essential consideration" bucket to fill in order to help a new safety manager get their safety program in order is planning . Here, a blueprint is needed that has both strategic and tactical characteristics. Let's highlight three of those characteristics.

Abstract HSE professionals and caring leaders, we all work hard on the safety and risk systems to do the best for our employees and companies. However, no matter how strong the system is, it gets trumped when the culture overwhelms it. Even companies renowned for the strength of their risk and safety management systems continue to experience large and significant incidents, and in some cases catastrophes. It is only when leadership, culture and systems work in complete harmony that the resilience of an organization to manage its significant risk is at an optimal level. And even then, it is a precarious balance to maintain that optimal mindset in the organization. In this presentation, a case study is presented that shows where the maturity of the company's risk systems and safety culture have been benchmarked against a global data base of companies. The risk maturity model and the scientific basis of measurement of culture are presented. The case study will demonstrate the practical application of the approach, and how the outcomes of the study provide input to leadership to make the necessary changes to the culture and the risk systems. And this can be done before significant events strike. It will also highlight how the process provides input to build systems that are less vulnerable. Within the presentation, Ewan will discuss a case study of a large South American miner, and highlight their efforts to perform a deep dive into their leadership, culture and risk management systems. The presentation will appeal to those who want to use culture and risk system maturity as a benchmarked key leading indicator to maximize the performance of their risk and safety management systems. Building and Executing an Effective Risk System for the Mining Industry As human beings, we have managed risk since the dawn of the ages, and have been adept at doing so. In order to survive, we hunted or gathered. If we did not take enough risk, we died. If we took much risk, we died. As individuals and tribes, risk had to be optimized to maximize our chances to thrive, as individuals and as tribes. (Figure 1)

Introduction In a "perfect" safety management system, in an industrial production environment, we would expect to find all potential workplace hazards identified with effective controls in place to prevent each hazard from resulting in or contributing to a workplace accident. For this to happen, I would envision a company with a solid, centralized safety management system in place, adequately staffed and funded at all levels to carry out the safety function. This group of safety professionals would have pro-actively and meticulously assessed the work environment to identify all hazards. They would have compared the existing hazard controls against the hierarchy of controls; eliminating and/or provided engineering controls for each hazard where possible. For remaining hazards where elimination and engineering control was not possible they would have implemented a perfect behavior management system. In this regard there is a oneness of purpose that separates safety from the factors associated with production and quality. (Haight, Yorio, Rost & Willmer 2014) For most of us who work in general industry this truly is a vision commensurate with Dorothy in the Land of Oz. In the real world we don't find many companies with strong centralized safety management, well developed and implemented top down instructions and sufficiently funded and staffed safety departments. I do believe that the vision of pro-active risk assessment is now being recognized as the way toward an achievable system of continuous improvement as it relates to hazard identification and risk reduction. One subset of workplace hazards are those hazards associated with machinery. Control of these hazards alone requires a major management initiative. Even today in the year 2017 we find production equipment "home grown", custom made in house, along with other equipment originally made decades earlier. When we examine this equipment we may find some guarding, no guarding or evidence of guarding that was removed. Often, the existing machine hazard control is the simple awareness of the hazard and hopeful avoidance by the operator.

Introduction Many companies have embraced the importance of conducting risk assessments as a good safety practice; while others still rely on the findings of incident investigations and regulations to approach risk reduction. Unfortunately, doing the latter can have numerous ‘blind spots’, which can prevent comprehensive understanding of hazards, risks, and necessary actions to prevent and/or mitigate risk events from occurring. There are different techniques available for conducting risk assessments to identify hazards, risks and barriers. These techniques range from brainstorming sessions, utilizing the Swiss cheese method, and conducting bowtie assessments. All of these methods add value to the risk assessment process; but the bowtie method is perceived to be the most thorough. The first ‘real’ bowtie diagrams appeared in 1979, but how and when the method found its exact origin is not completely clear. After the catastrophic incident on the Piper Alpha platform in 1988, the oil and gas industry was urged to gain more insight in the causality of seemingly independent events and conditions and to develop a systematic/systemic way of assuring control over these Hazards. In the early nineties the Royal Dutch / Shell Group began utilizing bowties, followed quickly by the other oil and gas industry leaders. Recently other industries have started to use bowties as well including aviation, mining, maritime, chemical and health care. (CGE Risk Management Solutions B.V., 2015) Where Does a Bowtie Fit into the Risk Management Process? The risk management process is generally comprised of four main phases, which repeat on a regular basis to support continuous improvement efforts. The four main phases of the risk assessment process are outlined below: Identify Risks Assess Risks Respond Monitor and Review

Introduction Ali A. Kshawe and Narayanan Vasudevan have worked in field of HS&E for past 25 years. During their course of work in petroleum refining the authors have been actively involved in developing HSSE requirements for contractors in refinery and implementing the same. Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC) is a major oil refining company in the world. Like of most of oil and gas production facilities KNPC outsources their maintenance and project construction activities. Oil refining industries have inherent hazards and risks which need to be mitigated during maintenance and project execution. Certain activities of contractors have potential to place either contract personnel or operating personnel or facility at risk. A sound contractor safety management will mitigate potential risk by having a proper system of contractor selection and monitoring their activities on day to day basis. KNPC has developed a sound management system for all KPC subsidiaries. It begins with planning which include communication of risks of contract to potential bidders and the company HSSE management system which part of scope of contract. Each potential contractor has to undergo an HSSE prequalification. The objective of the HSE Pre-qualification is to screen potential contractors to establish that they have the necessary experience and capability to undertake the scope of work in an HSE responsible manner, and to effectively deal with the associated risks. The contractors who pass the prequalification are included in list of bidders.

The PDF file is a slide presentation. Basic Safety Management Elements The elements that make up an effective basic safety management plan Management/Policy Recordkeeping Loss Analysis Safety & Health Education/Training Safety & Health Inspections/Surveys Accident/Incident Reporting & Investigations Plan & Programs Review 1. MANAGEMENT The employer has the responsibility of providing a workplace free of any recognized hazards Safety management plan must rest on a solid foundation of management commitment and support Commitment To pledge or assign to some particular course or use Support To provide resources Uphold, advocate, champion Management must thoughtfully and thoroughly develop a safety and health policy that can be understood, believed and sets the tone for action Must understand what the policy means Policy should be short and to the point (preferably approximately a half page) Must establish challenging (realistic) goals for that particular organization/industry

Introduction Since 2005, I have strived to honor and respect others during safety meetings and while enforcing safety policies. I have worked with a wide range of companies in the construction, agriculture, and general industries. However, when I started down this career path, my only qualification was being bilingual and trustworthy. Regardless of where you are on your career path, I want to encourage you to keep learning and keep growing. You are part of an industry that pays you to invest in yourself. Not only will this career path change your life; more importantly, you will be able to change the lives of many others. My personal vision is to empower others with practical ways that will help them understand, improve, and enjoy their lives. My mission is to lead by example, have a positive servant attitude, and remain accountable. I make every effort to leave a legacy of never giving up on any person or company. Safety is not about how much you know; it's about how you get along with people. The way you manage your safety and health program is a reflection of the way you manage life. Congratulations on accepting this challenge! Unfortunately, I have found that there are unique challenges that safety professionals face. In this paper, we will identify four key elements required in a safety program. We will also discuss techniques on how to apply these elements. These methods will transform safety from a program into a culture. My goal is to help you understand these challenges and give you some solutions or ideas that will help you deal with these issues. Are you going to take the easy way out and ignore your company's culture, or will you step up to the challenge? Perception vs. Reality As safety professionals, you will be challenged by your employees to help solve a vast array of issues. Don't only focus on your job description and only doing "your job." In order to create transformation in your company's safety culture, you have to build genuine trust. To do so, you will need to learn to speak the employees' language. Spend time with them at the work site, in the shop, or at lunch. Talk with employees, listen to them, and they will begin to see that you truly care about them. You will begin to understand them better, and you will become relatable to them. This provides a bond where they can give you their honest and genuine feedback. Employee feedback is a priceless tool that directly affects your safety culture. You can use this feedback as a catalyst for change, and to strengthen your rapport.

Introduction Most occupational safety and health (OSH) professionals would agree that there is an evolution underway in how we practice. Going back ten years or so, the predominance of thought leaders postulating that our compliance-based approach to developing workplace safety programs had run out of steam, so to speak, grew. This thinking was based upon a review of statistical data that showed a slowing in the reduction of fatalities and, in some cases, an increase in the number of serious injuries; those which result in permanent disability or lengthy periods of time off work. It also was not unusual for large organizations with deep pockets for OSH resources to end up with low or nonexistent incident rates of less serious injuries, but still experience multiple fatalities or catastrophic events in the same time frame. These awakenings resulted in an introspective review of the of the basic tenets upon which most OSH programs were based, and many OSH professionals concluded that the profession has been mistaken in believing that focusing efforts on the reducing in frequency of minor incidents would lead to a simultaneous reduction in the severity of them. It is important to note that movement away from a reliance on compliance-based approaches does not mean ignoring the requirements of applicable laws and regulations. In fact, all OHSMS mention the need to comply. As noted below, OSH policies must mention compliance as a primary expectation. However, compliance is not intended to be the only focus nor is it intended to be the type of focus that obscures the systemic foundation needed for achieving continuous improvement.

Introduction A safe work place takes a coordinated effort on the part of all employees. Senior leaders establish safety-oriented vision and values, middle managers create safety management systems, safety professionals develop procedures, and frontline employees complete the work as safely as possible. Frontline supervisors, however, have perhaps the most crucial role. Frontline supervision is where safety comes together: where the vision and values are executed, where the procedures are complied with, where decisions are implemented, and where safety can be seen. It is the moment-by-moment decisions and actions of the frontline supervisor that ensure the workplace is safe, and the work is done safely, or not. Improved safety performance requires organizations do a better job of setting frontline supervisors up for success. Too often, supervisors are told that safety is of primary importance, but their role in making that happen is poorly defined, their priorities are competing, and they aren't trained in the skills needed to be successful. Engagement Is Key It's instructive to explore how supervisors view their role in safety. Too often, frontline supervisors see their job as primarily ensuring compliance with safety rules and regulations. But compliance only goes so far. To create the safest possible work environment, organizations need more than just compliance. They need workers to do the right thing all the time, even when supervisors aren't watching. They need engaged employees. So how can frontline supervisors go beyond compliance and create an environment where the workforce is truly engaged in safety? The first step is to define employee engagement. While there are many definitions of engagement, it is helpful to define engagement from a behavioral perspective. By focusing on what engaged employees do, it is easier for supervisors to understand their role in encouraging engagement. Below are examples of the behaviors that are characteristic of engaged workers (and exemplary safety cultures).

Introduction Many companies have embraced the importance of conducting risk assessments as a good safety practice; while others still rely on the findings of incident investigations and regulations to approach risk reduction. Unfortunately, doing the latter can have numerous ‘blind spots’, which can prevent comprehensive understanding of hazards, risks, and necessary actions to prevent and/or mitigate risk events from occurring. There are different techniques available for conducting risk assessments to identify hazards, risks and barriers. These techniques range from brainstorming sessions, utilizing the Swiss cheese method, and conducting bowtie assessments. All of these methods add value to the risk assessment process; but the bowtie method is perceived to be the most thorough. The first ‘real’ bowtie diagrams appeared in 1979, but how and when the method found its exact origin is not completely clear. After the catastrophic incident on the Piper Alpha platform in 1988, the oil and gas industry was urged to gain more insight in the causality of seemingly independent events and conditions and to develop a systematic/systemic way of assuring control over these Hazards. In the early nineties the Royal Dutch / Shell Group began utilizing bowties, followed quickly by the other oil and gas industry leaders. Recently other industries have started to use bowties as well including aviation, mining, maritime, chemical and health care. (CGE Risk Management Solutions B.V., 2015) Where Does a Bowtie Fit into the Risk Management Process? The risk management process is generally comprised of four main phases, which repeat on a regular basis to support continuous improvement efforts. The four main phases of the risk assessment process are outlined below: Identify Risks Assess Risks Respond Monitor and Review

Introduction As professionals, managers or engineers working in the field of safety at work, what we want is a work environment with no accidents. But we have to perform in an area where absolute perfection is rarely achieved, and we have to expect that risk will sometimes arise from a hazard (equipment failure, negligence or inattention of a worker, a bad maintenance program, lack of knowledge, etc.). Even when the risk is very low, an accident could occur. This can be a troubling thought for many people, and especially for those dedicated to prevention. We know that risk can never be entirely eliminated from an activity unless the activity is completely stopped, and we must prioritize certain prevention activities over others to maximize security. In this paper, the author presents some practices in risk management that can help in making choices that ensure the best possible safety level for workers. How can managers and professionals reach acceptable and tolerable levels of risk? In our personal lives, public policies or workplaces, can we use concepts like probabilities, the precautionary principle, ALARA, or acceptable risks to justify the risk level we can morally and legally accept? Safety should be more about putting energies on known and proven dangers than on eliminating hypothetical and rare risks. As we all know, the resources that can be devoted to health and safety are not infinite. We have to be able to advise stakeholders to focus less on eliminating minuscule, hypothetical risks that distract workers and employers from the known and proven threats. We must intensify our efforts in prevention, but we must also help the management team to make the best decisions possible and act where it counts and where we can expect the best results in safety.

Auditing Auditing - the very word can scare the most seasoned safety professional. The fear of finding the unknown has kept many people from doing the necessary task of reviewing and examining the policies and procedures put in place to keep people safe. Compare this to not going to the doctor because you are afraid of the diagnosis. What Is an Audit? An audit is defined as a systematic, methodical review of safety policies, procedures, rules and regulations. The goal is to determine how current systems are working and if they can be improved through revision, reworking or revocation. An audit is not simply: A checklist An inspection A discipline tool, or Something done on an ad hoc basis A checklist is a tool, often used during an audit to ensure the auditor remembers everything they need to assess. For example, you can use a checklist to determine if there are enough fire extinguishers or whether or not safety meetings were conducted. An inspection is another tool to evaluate things and behaviors. Inspections provide a snapshot of current conditions but does validate whether systems and procedures are working properly and if not, why they aren't. Audits, when done correctly, provide an assessment of the overall management system that is in place to manage the fleet and fleet risk. Audits may be formal or, informal and conducted by external or internal auditors. One example of an informal audit is one performed routinely by a supervisor with oversight responsibilities. By design, formal audits yield a final written work product that should be reviewed by those held accountable for policy implementation. Once language is agreed upon, the report should guide corrective and preventive action plans.

A culture of interdependence is paramount in safety excellence processes and should be communicated in the vision, values, and interacting and guiding roles of an organization. In the words of Stephen Covey, renowned author and leadership theorist, "interdependence opens up worlds of possibilities for deep, rich, meaningful associations, for geometrically increased productivity, for serving, for contributing, for learning, for growing" (Covey 1989, p. 187). Other characteristics associated with interdependent cultures include "the ability to work effectively across organizational boundaries, openness and candor, multi-faceted standards of success and synergies being sought across the whole enterprise" (Palus 2014, p. 6). It is with this culture mind that the Environment, Health, Safety and Sustainability teams of L'Oréal Operations Americas focuses on five very key safety management systems elements to reduce risk. In the L'Oréal Americas Operations Group, five key programs are at the core of the continuous improvement approach and value proposition of zero harm and zero incidents. These programs, referred to at L'Oréal as "The Big Five" are the cornerstones of our leadership program. They are: The Managing Effective Safety Using Recognition and Refocusing (MESUR) Program; The Safety Improvement Opportunity (SIO) program; The Safety Hazard Assessment Program (SHAP); The Validation Program; and The Powered Industrial Truck (PIT) program. MESUR: Managing Effective Safety Using Recognition and Refocusing L'Oréal's main leading indicator is a version of a behavior based safety program that was created internally and is called MESUR (Measuring Effective Safety Using Recognition and Refocusing). MESUR is a cultural program that is based on structured and systematic meetings between managers and colleagues to develop the ability of the colleague to identify risks in their daily activities and act upon what they see to mitigate these risks. The MESUR program aims at making each colleague aware of their good practices and unsafe practices. Therefore this program allows them to act at their level to better control risks related to their activity.

Introduction Accurate risk decisions are critical for effective and efficient safety programs. Recent research examining chemical exposure risk judgments identified opportunities for improving decision accuracy. This presentation explores actions that safety professionals can use to improve their risk decision accuracy and thus the effectiveness and efficiency of their safety management systems. Background: Risk Decisions at the Heart of Safety Management Hazard and risk assessments are at the heart of our safety and health management systems. They determine the types of training, mitigation, monitoring, and change management systems that must be implemented in our workplaces and have direct influence on the health and safety programs that we put in place. Accordingly, accurate risk decisions are critical for effective and efficient workplace safety and health management (Figure 1). Underestimate risk and our safety and health programs become ineffective as employees whose risk was underestimated continue to perform their duties with the risks unabated. Overestimate risk and our programs become inefficient as limited resources are wasted on risk controls where none were needed. The most effective and efficient safety and health programs begin with an emphasis on robust, accurate, and consistent risk assessment decisions. Risk Decision Accuracy Recent research examining worker chemical exposure risk judgments has identified opportunities for improving risk decision accuracy. Figure 2 is illustrative of the findings. Safety and health professionals were asked to rate the intensity of worker exposures to a chemical relative to its occupational exposure limit (OEL) using the exposure risk rating scale in Figure 3. Risk decisions were collected twice for each participant: once before receiving training on simple rules-of-thumb for interpreting data and once after the training. The accuracy of participant judgments increased after the simple rule-of-thumb training. In addition, a bias toward underestimation of risk was eliminated, possibly replaced by an overestimation bias.